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INTRODUCTION
Prior to the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy
Clarification Act ("PPVPRCA"),' the Eleventh Amendment2 afforded
states immunity from actions arising under the federal patent laws.'
A patent holder had no remedy if a state4 infringed or otherwise
violated his patent because such actions fall exclusively under federal
jurisdiction and cannot be tried in state court.5 Nor could a patent
1. Pub. L. No. 102-560, 106 Stat. 4230 (1992) (codified in part at 35 U.S.C. §§ 271, 296
(1994)).
2. The Eleventh Amendment states that "[t]he judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one
of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State." U.S. CONST. amend. XL
3. See, e.g., Chew v. California, 893 F.2d 331, 336 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (ruling that the state was
immune from a patent infringement suit under the Eleventh Amendment); Ciba-Geigy Corp. v.
Aiza Corp., 804 F. Supp. 614, 625-26 (D.N.J. 1992) (holding that Congress had not abrogated
state immunity from patent suits and the state university had not waived its sovereign
immunity); Kersavage v. University of Tenn., 731 F. Supp. 1327, 1330 (E.D. Tenn. 1989)
(holding that a state university was immune from a patent infringement suit).
4. For the purposes of this Comment, a "state" refers to a state, a state agency, state
officials, and state instrumentalities including state universities. See generally Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 117 S. Ct. 900, 902-05 (1997) (discussing several federal court decisions on
whether state instrumentalities are "arms-of-the-state" for Eleventh Amendment purposes, but
declining to address the issue).
5. Although the Eleventh Amendment only affords states immunity from suits in the
federal court system, a citizen can still bring an action against a state in state court. However, if
a state violates a law over which federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction, such as patent,
copyright, bankruptcy and antitrust law, a citizen has no remedy in a state court. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1338(a) (1994) ("[T]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, copyrights, and
trademarks. Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts of the states in patent, plant
variety, and copyright cases."). This anomaly is problematic. Justice Stevens remarked:
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holder sue a state for infringement in federal court because, under
the Eleventh Amendment, states are considered sovereign entities
within the federal system and generally cannot be sued by individuals
in the federal court system.6
In 1992, Congress attempted to rectify this problem by enacting
the PPVPRCA to abrogate7 state immunity from federal patent suits.
Using the Supreme Court's judicial interpretation of Eleventh
Amendment immunity as a guide," Congress expressed its intention
to extend federal jurisdiction over states in "unmistakably clear"9
language: "Any State... shall not be immune.... from suit in
Federal court by any person,... for infringement of a patent... or
for any other violation under [the patent] title.""' Congress
attempted to create a uniform system in which citizens, states, and
the Federal Government are similarly situated under the patent
laws." Congress felt that such uniformity was essential to fulfill its
constitutional obligation to promote innovation and protect the
rights of patent owners.
12
As federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over cases arising under... federal laws,
the majority's conclusion that the Eleventh Amendment shields States from being
sued under them in federal court suggests that persons harmed by state violations of
federal copyright, bankruptcy, and antitrust laws have no remedy.
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 77 n.1 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting), overruling
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
6. See, e.g., supra note 3 (providing examples of cases in which states were immune from
patent suits).
7. To abrogate means to "annul, cancel, revoke, repeal, or destroy... to repeal a former
law by legislative act, or by usage." See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 8 (6th ed. 1990).
8. As discussed in Part I of this Comment, the Court continually has altered its
interpretation of the scope of state immunity since it first expanded the scope of the Eleventh
Amendment in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
9. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985) (establishing the
standard that Congress must state its intent to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity in
unequivocal terms in the language of the statute).
10. 35 U.S.C. § 296(a) (1994). Furthermore, the language of the statute clearly states
Congress' intent to treat private parties and states equally. See id. § 296(b) (availing
"[r]emedies ... to the same extent as such remedies are available for such a violation in a suit
against any private entity"); id. § 271(h) (subjecting "[a]ny State... to the provisions of this
title in the same manner and to the same extent as any nongovernmental entity").
11. Set S. REP. No. 102-280, at 9 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.CAN. 3087, 3095 ("This
legislation will rectify the situation and provide uniform protection throughout the patent and
trademark systems."). Even the Federal Government has consented to patent suits in federal
courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (1994) ("Whenever an invention described in and covered by a
patent of the United States is used or manufactured by or for the United States without
license ... the [patent] owner's remedy shall be by action against the United States in the
United States Court of Federal Claims .... "). But cf. infra note 155 (discussing limited liability
of the United States in patent suits).
12. See S. REP. No. 102-280, at 9 (explaining that promotion of innovation depends on
uniform application of patent law, where states are as liable for violations as Federal
Government and private citizens); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (stating that Congress
shall have the power "to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
1738 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:1735
Despite Congress' attempt to abrogate Eleventh Amendment
immunity from patent suits, 3 the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Seminole Tribe v. F/orida 14 has renewed the debate about the extent to
which states are immune from such challenges. 5 In Seminole Tribe,
the Court held that, notwithstanding its grant of broad powers to
regulate interstate commerce, the Commerce Clause does not permit
Congress to abrogate state immunity. 6 After Seminole Tribe, a state's
broad immunity can be limited only under a few narrow exceptions,
two of which are discussed in this Comment. 7 First, a state may waive
its immunity, either expressly or under the doctrine of implied
waiver. 8  A state expressly waives its sovereign immunity if it
specifically consents to suit in federal court.19 Under the doctrine of
implied waiver, a state constructively waives its Eleventh Amendment
immunity if it accepts federal funding or participates in a federally
regulated activity, and Congress explicitly has conditioned such
funding or participation on the state waiving its immunity."' Second,
Congress may abrogate state immunity to enforce the substantive
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment, but only if its intent to
abrogate immunity is made in "unmistakably clear language.
Discoveries").
13. See S. REP. No. 102-280, at 1 (explaining that the purpose of the PPVPRCA was to
clarify Congress' intent to abrogate state immunity from patent infringement suits).
14. 517 U.S. 44 (1996), overrulingPennsylvaniav. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
15. Compare Genentech, Inc. v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 939 F. Supp. 639, 642 (S.D. Ind.
1996) (holding that a state university was immune from a declaratory judgment action in a
patent infringement suit), rev'd in part and remanded, 143 F.3d 1446 (Fed. Cir.), petition for cert.
filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3337 (U.S. Nov. 3, 1998) (No. 98-731), with College Say. Bank v. Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 948 F. Supp. 400, 425 (D.NJ. 1996) (holding that
Congress could abrogate state immunity from a patent infringement suit), affd, 148 F.3d 1343
(Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 67 U.S.L.W. 3258, 3279 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1999) (No. 98-531). See
generally Gen-Probe v. Amoco Corp., 926 F. Supp. 948, 954 n.6 (S.D. Cal. 1996) (noting that
after Seminole Tribe Congress probably could not abrogate state immunity from suits arising
under patent law).
16. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 71 (arguing that Article I cannot be used to circumvent
the Eleventh Amendment's restrictions on federal jurisdiction).
17. The third exception to broad state immunity is the doctrine of Ex parte Young, under
which a state can be amenable to suit in federal court if an individual sues a state official to
enjoin conduct that violates federal law. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 45 (describing the Ex
parte Youngdoctrine as an exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity); see also infra Part I.B.1
(discussing briefly Ex parte Young). The Ex parte Young doctrine is beyond the scope of this
Comment.
18. See generally Kit Kinports, Implied Waiver After Seminole Tribe, 82 MINN. L. REV. 793, 798-
807 (1998) (discussing the theories of abrogation and waiver). Implied waiver also is referred
to as constructive waiver.
19. SeeAtascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985) ("[I]f a State waives its
immunity and consents to suit in federal court, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the
action." (citing Clarkv. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436,447 (1883))).
20. See Kinports, supra note 18, at 795, 820 nn.1 17-18 (explaining the doctrine of implied
waiver); see also infra Part I.B.2.
21. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 238 (recognizing that the Eleventh Amendment is limited
under Congress' Fourteenth Amendment power) (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456
1998] SEMINOLE TRIBE V. FLORIDA 1739
Despite the PPVPRCA, the Seminole Tribe decision suggests that states
once again may be immune from suits arising under the patent code,
potentially leaving those with patent actions against states without any
22
recourse.
This Comment examines state immunity from patent suits in light
of the Supreme Court's reexpansion of Eleventh Amendment
immunity in Seminole Tribe.s It addresses whether Congress has the
power to abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity from
suits arising under the federal patent laws, or, in the alternative,
whether a state has constructively waived its immunity from patent
suits by participating in and benefiting from the patent process. Part
I briefly summarizes the origin of the Eleventh Amendment and
several of the judicial decisions that have expanded and restricted the
scope of state immunity from suits in federal court. Part II discusses
Congress' abrogation of state immunity from patent suits and the
judicial decisions permitting this abrogation that preceded the
Seminole Tribe decision. Part III considers the reaction among federal
courts to the Seminole Tribe decision. To illustrate the effect of
Seminole Tribe, Part III discusses a lawsuit in which a state university
claimed immunity from suit when a corporation moved for a
declaratory judgment that a patent owned by the university was
(1976)). Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, "Congress shall have the power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of [the Fourteenth Amendment]," including
Section 1 which provides, "nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. This Comment focuses on the effect of
Seminole Tribe on patent law rather than on the distinction, or lack thereof, between the
doctrines of implied waiver and abrogation. An attempt was made to explain these doctrines
briefly. For a more thorough explanation and a discussion of the status of abrogation and
implied waiver after Seminole Tribe, see Kinports, supra note 18.
22. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 77 n.1 (Stevens,J, dissenting) (arguing that the majority's
decision prevents Congress from providing a federal forum for actions that are under exclusive
federal jurisdiction, including patent and copyright law, environmental law, bankruptcy, and
antitrust law, where those injured have no alternative remedy). But see id. at 72 n.16 (majority
opinion) (responding to Justice Stevens that individuals may obtain injunctive relief against
state officials under Ex parte Young and noting that abrogation of immunity in many areas of
exclusive federal jurisdiction is not widely recognized among courts).
23. Articles on the authority of Congress to abrogate state Eleventh Amendment immunity
from patent suits were published after the Supreme Court decision in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas
Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989). See generally Susan C. Hill, Comment, Are States Free to Pirate Copyrighted
Materials and Infringe Patents?-Pennsylvania v. Union Gas May Mean They Are Not, 92 W. VA. L.
RE%,. 487, 519 (1990) (concluding that states should and likely will be amenable to suits after
Congress amends patent and copyright statutes to include explicit language of its intent to
abrogate state immunity); Kenneth S. Weitzman, Comment, Copyright and Patent Clause of the
Constitution: Does Congress Have the Authority to Abrogate State Eleventh Amendment Sovereign
Immunity After Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.?, 2 SEON HALL CONSr. LJ. 297, 334 (1991)
(concluding that Congress should not be allowed to abrogate unilaterally Eleventh Amendment
immunity). Since the publication of these articles, Congress has amended the patent statute to
include language that "unmistakably" abrogates state immunity, although its authority to
abrogate recently has been questioned in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Seminole
Tribe.
1740 THE AMERICAN UNIVERsITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:1735
invalid, and therefore, not infringed.24  This section suggests that
Congress should be allowed to abrogate state immunity from all suits
arising under the federal patent laws, or alternatively, that the federal
courts should treat a state's participation in the patent process as a
constructive waiver of its immunity. Finally, Part IV concludes that
the federal courts should clarify the limitations on state immunity
under the doctrines of abrogation and implied waiver. Only by
clarifying these doctrines and allowing Congress to abrogate state
immunity from patent suits will courts ultimately hold states
accountable for violating federal patent laws. If courts allow states to
infringe patents and enforce invalid patents against alleged
infringers, the promotion of the progress of science will suffer and
congressional intent will be ignored.
I. THE ORIGIN ANDJUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Over the last century, the Supreme Court has continually redefined
the scope of Congress' power to limit a state's Eleventh Amendment
immunity.25 The Court often failed to reach a consensus on its
interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment. 26 The justices could not
24. See Genentech, Inc. v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 143 F.3d 1446 (Fed. Cir.) (refusing to
decide if Congress had the power to abrogate immunity but holding that the state university
constructively consented to a declaratory judgment action in federal court, and thereby waived
its immunity from suit), petitionfor cert. filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3337 (U.S. Nov. 3, 1998) (No. 98-731),
revg939 F. Supp. 639, 645 (S.D. Ind. 1996) (holding that Congress had no power to abrogate
state immunity from a declaratoryjudgment action and holding that the state university did not
waive its immunity by obtaining a patent or filing a infringement claim). This case was chosen
because it facilitates an analysis of many of the pertinent issues concerning the status of state
immunity from patent suits following the Court's Seminole Tribe decision. Although this case
presents the issue of a declaratory judgment action filed by an alleged infringer against a
patent-owning state university, College Savings v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education
Expense Board, 148 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 67 U.S.L.W. 3258, 3279 (U.S.Jan.
8, 1999) (No. 98-531), a case in which a patent owner filed an infringement action against a
state, also is discussed. See infra notes 235-39 and accompanying text.
25. See infra Part I.B (detailing the Court's expansion and restriction of the scope of
Eleventh Amendment immunity).
26. See, e.g., Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 224 (1989) (5-4 decision); Pennsylvania v.
Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 3 (1989) (plurality opinion), overruled by Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 66
(5-4 decision); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 235 (1985) (5-4 decision);
Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Ala. Docks Dep't, 377 U.S. 184, 198 (1964) (5-4 decision), overruled in
part by Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468 (1987) (plurality
opinion); Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275, 283 (1959) (5-3 decision).
Some of the justices have espoused a literal reading of the Eleventh Amendment, arguing
against the interpretation of the Supreme Court in Hans v Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), that
the Eleventh Amendment is a general grant of immunity to the states. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at
259 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (claiming that the constitutional principle of sovereign immunity
does not exist); Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 23 (Stevens, J., concurring) (supporting a more literal
interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment as contrasted with the Court's expansive
interpretation in Hans).
Other justices in Union Gas rejected this "comprehensive approach" to the Eleventh
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agree on which constitutional provisions specifically grant Congress
the power to abrogate or constructively waive state immunity from
actions brought against the states in the federal court system.2 7
A. The Origin of the Eleventh Amendment
The movement to ratify the Eleventh Amendment was precipitated
in 1793 by the Supreme Court's decision in Chisholm v. Georgia,
28
which held a state liable to suit by non-citizens of the state.2 In
Chisholm, two citizens of South Carolina, acting as executors for a
British creditor, sued the state of Georgia for the value of military
supplies sold to the state." The Court defeated Georgia's claim of
original jurisdiction by finding the state liable under Article III,
Section 2 of the Constitutions' and the Judiciary Act of 1789.2 This
outcome instigated a national movement to override the decision
with a constitutional amendment."s
In 1798, the states ratified the Eleventh Amendment, granting the
states limited immunity from federal actions.34  The Eleventh
Amendment provides that: "The judicial power of the United States
Amendment, supporting the more expansive interpretation set forth in Hans that the Eleventh
Amendment not only provides states immunity in diversity cases but also protects states from
federal suits brought by their own citizens. See id. at 30 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (rejecting an invitation to overrule Hans).
27. Compare Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 5, 15 (claiming that Congress may abrogate state
immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause), with Seminole Tribe
517 U.S. at 72-73 (arguing that Congress cannot use its Article I powers, such as its Commerce
Clause power, to circumvent Article III limits on federal jurisdiction), and Parden, 377 U.S. at
196 (inferring a state's implied consent to federal jurisdiction where the state entered into an
activity subject to federal regulation and federal jurisdiction), and Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 41
(Scalia,J., concurring in part) (asserting that the Parden waiver doctrine was partially overruled
and otherwise in doubt).
28. 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419 (1773).
29. See id. at 440.
30. See id. at 420.
31. The Constitution states:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under the this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States .... to Controversies to which the United
States shall be a Party; to Controversies between two or more States; between a State
and Citizens of another State; between Citizens of different States ....
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
32. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 73, 80 (1789) (repealed 1948) (delineating
the jurisdictional powers of the federal court system).
33. Although the decision shocked the nation, it is interesting to note that only Justice
Iredell dissented in Chisholm. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 12 (1890) (noting that the
country's opinion accorded with the dissent in Chisholm). Justice Iredell's dissent provided a
foundation on which to expand state immunity from suit and was cited by the Court in support
of expanding immunity. See id. (noting that Justice Iredell broke away from the narrow
interpretation of the Constitution and recognized that individuals had not sued states in the
past and that the Court should not subject states to suits by individuals); see also Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662 (1974) (describing the national sentiment to override the Chisholm
decision rapidly).
34. U.S. CONST. amend. XI (declared ratifiedJanuary 8, 1798).
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shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State."' 5 Although this language does not appear to bar suits brought
against a state in federal court by its own citizens,6 judicial
interpretations of the Eleventh Amendment have afforded states
more expansive immunity.37 The Supreme Court, however, rarely has
reached a consensus on the scope of state immunity afforded by the
Eleventh Amendment8
B. Judicial Interpretation of Eleventh Amendment Immunity
One hundred years after the ratification of the Eleventh
Amendment, the Supreme Court expansively interpreted the scope
of state immunity in Hans v. Louisiana.39 In Hans, a citizen of
Louisiana sued the state in a United States circuit court to recover the
value of bonds that the state had issued under a contract it later
repudiated.40 The Supreme Court ruled unanimously that a citizen of
a state could not bring a suit involving a question of federal law
against that state in federal court.4 The Court concluded that it was
anomalous for a state to be held liable in a federal court to its own
citizens and yet immune from similar actions brought by citizens of
other states or foreign states.42 Therefore, the Court expanded the
scope of state immunity under the Eleventh Amendment by
recognizing that states were sovereign entities within the federal
court system and could not be sued without their consent.43 This
35. See id.
36. See Edelman, 415 U.S. at 662-63 (noting that the Court has consistently ruled that the
Eleventh Amendment bars suits against unconsenting states brought by citizens of any state).
37. See Hans, 134 U.S. at 17 (stating that a state cannot be sued without its consent).
38. See supra note 26 (reporting that many of the Court's decisions on Eleventh
Amendment issues were split decisions).
39. 134U.S. 1 (1890).
40. See id. at l-3.
41. See id. at 10.
42. See id. at 10-11. In support of its rationale, the Court quoted from THE FEDERALiST and
the Virginia Convention, claiming that framers like Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and
John Marshall believed that states were sovereign entities not amenable to suits brought by
individuals. See id. at 12-15. But seeAtascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 300 (1985)
(Brennan, J. dissenting) (arguing that the Court's historical interpretation was "plainly
mistaken" and claiming that the Court took the framers' comments, which addressed only the
state-citizen diversity clause, out of context).
43. See Hans, 134 U.S. at 17 (arguing that a state cannot be sued in its own courts or other
courts but that it voluntarily may waive its privilege of immunity). Justices have disagreed with
the expansive immunity described in Hans. See supra note 26; see also Pennsylvania v. Union Gas
Co., 491 U.S. 1, 23 (1989) (granting Congress power to abrogate immunity under Commerce
Clause and yet avoiding the decision to overrule Hans), overuled by Seminole Tribe v. Florida,
517 U.S. 44 (1996).
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landmark decision precluded virtually all suits against unconsenting
states in federal courts."
Following Hans, the Court routinely restricted and expanded the
scope of Eleventh Amendment immunity in a long line of cases that
ultimately identified three instances in which a state is subject to
federal suit. First, the Court ruled that the Eleventh Amendment did
not bar suits against state officials for prospective injunctive relief.45
Second, the Court concluded that the states could not only expressly
waive immunity, but in some cases, the states could consent to suit
under the implied waiver theory. 6 Finally, the Court determined that
in certain circumstances, Congress could abrogate state immunity
from federal suits. 4 7 Although the distinction between implied waiver
and abrogation is often unclear,48 implied waiver generally involves a
state making a voluntary decision to constructively consent to suit,
while abrogation occurs when Congress enacts legislation that forces
a state to consent to suit.49
1. The Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits against state officials for
prospective injunctive relief
In the early twentieth century, the Court created the first exception
to expansive state immunity. In Ex parte Young,0 the Court ruled that
the Eleventh Amendment does not bar actions for prospective
injunctive relief brought by individuals in federal court against a state
official who violated federal law while acting within the scope of his
official duties.5' This rule arose out of a suit brought by stockholders
in a railroad company against a state Attorney GeneralY. Because the
Attorney General attempted to enforce an unconstitutional legislative
enactment in the name of the state, the majority held that he acted
outside of his representative character and consequently held him
44. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S at 54 n.7 (citing an exhaustive list of cases from 1890 to 1993
that reaffirm the Court's decision in Hans).
45. See infra Part I.B.1.
46. See infra Part I.B.2; see also Kinports, supra note 18, at 799-801 (tracing the history of and
explaining the doctrine of implied waiver).
47. See infra Part I.B.3.
48. See infra note 81 (explaining the evolution of the congressional power to abrogate state
immunity).
49. See Kinports, supra note 18, at 807 ("Implied waiver presupposes a voluntary decision
on the part of the states to forego their Eleventh Amendment protection, whereas abrogation is
an exercise of congressional power to remove the states' immunity regardless of their wishes."
(quoting Blatchford v. Native Village, 501 U.S. 775, 787-88 (1991))).
50. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
51. Seeid at159-60.
52. See id. at 131. The Attorney General was trying to impose rates through enforcement of
a state act in contravention to the Fourteenth Amendment and the stockholders sought an
injunction against the enforcement of the act. See id.
17431998]
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personally liable for his actions.s
Following Exparte Young, courts no longer interpreted the Eleventh
Amendment as a bar to suits against state officials to enjoin conduct
that violated federal law. 4 Notably, however, the Court subsequently
limited the awards available in Ex parte Young suits to prospective
injunctive relief 55  Thus, the Eleventh Amendment continued to
prohibit suits for monetary damages paid out of state funds,
regardless of whether the state itself was named as a defendant. '
Although Ex parte Young had a limited application, the decision was
significant because for the first time the Court restricted its broad
interpretation of the scope of state immunity 7 as articulated in Hans
v. Louisiana.&
2. A state may constructively waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity
Although a state always may waive its immunity by specifically
consenting to suit in federal court,59 the Court in Parden v. Terminal
Railway of Alabama State Docks Departmenr further limited Eleventh
Amendment immunity by inferring an implied or constructive waiver
of immunity' in the absence of an expressed waiver. 2 In Parden,
53. See id. at 159-60; see also Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 692 (1978) (holding that the
Eleventh Amendment did not prevent the Court from awarding attorney fees to prisoners who
alleged that guards violated their constitutional rights because the guards, acting in their
official capacity, refused to cure constitutional violations previously identified in district court).
54. See Edelman v.Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664 (1974) (explaining that under Exparte Young,
a government official was not immune from a federal suit alleging a constitutional violation).
55. See Edelman, 415 U.S. at 668-69 (limiting awards in suits against state officials to
prospective relief and refusing to award retrospective relief).
56. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Department of the Treasury of Ind., 323 U.S. 459, 463
(1945) (holding that a suit for monetary damages paid out of a state treasury was suit against
the state, and the state could invoke sovereign immunity even if state officials were nominal
defendants); cf. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 664 (noting that the holding in Exparte Young was limited
to providing prospective injunctive relief against state officials).
57. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 166 (1908) (allowing suits against state officers who
acted outside the scope of their official capacity by enforcing an unconstitutional statute).
58. 134 U.S. 1, 17 (1890) (extending to the states immunity from all suits brought by
citizens and non-citizens of the state).
59. See Hans, 134 U.S. at 17 ("[T]he sovereign cannot be sued in its own courts, or in any
other, without its consent and permission; but it may ... waive this privilege, and permit itself to
be made a defendant in a suit by individuals, or by another state."); see also Atascadero State
Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985) (noting that a state is not immune upon consenting
to suit).
60. 377 U.S. 184 (1964), overruled in parl by Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub.
Transp., 483 U.S. 468 (1987).
61. See Kinports, supra note 18, at 798-801 (providing a history and explanation of implied
waiver). The question of whether a state has expressly or constructively waived its immunity is
one of federal law. See Parden, 377 U.S. at 196 (explaining that state actions in the sphere of
federal activity are necessarily subject to interpretation under federal law).
62. See Parden, 377 U.S. at 193 (concluding that the state constructively waived its immunity
by participating in a federal program that was governed by a statute providing for amenability to
suit in federal courts). The dissent in Parden argued that the Court should not infer a waiver
unless Congress clearly considered the implications of waiver and expressly conditioned
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citizens of the state of Alabama successfully sued a state-owned
railroad under the Federal Employees Liability Act ("FELA") for
injuries sustained while employed by the railroad. 3 The Parden
majority held that Congress enacted FELA under its broad commerce
power to hold every common carrier liable in damages for injuries
suffered by its employees. 65 The Court believed that Congress'
reference to "every" common carrier indicated that it never intended
to exempt state-owned railroads from liability.66 The Court assumed
that, in the absence of an express provision to the contrary, a state
was just as liable to its employees as a privately-owned company. To
find otherwise, the majority reasoned, would result in the creation of
a "right without a remedy."''
The Court in Parden inferred the implied waiver in three steps.
First, it reasoned that the state ratified the Commerce Clause, giving
Congress the power to create a right of action against interstate
railroads.t0 Second, it rationalized that, in enacting FELA, Congress
conditioned the right to operate a railroad on a state's consent to
liability in federal courts.70  And finally, the Court believed that by
operating the railroad in interstate commerce, the state accepted the
conditions of FELA, including consent to federal suits. 7  The Court
thereby created the implied or constructive waiver doctrine for
participation in a federally regulated activity on a state's consent to waive immunity. See id. at
198-99 (White,J, dissenting). Justice White's dissenting opinion is similar to that expressed by
the majority in Welch v. Texas Department of Highways & Public Transportation, 483 U.S. 468
(1987), which required that the statute itself contain the express intent of Congress to waive
state immunity. See Welch, 483 U.S. at 478.
63. See Parden, 377 U.S. at 184-85 (interpreting FELA, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60, broadly to bring
the states within the definition of "employer").
64. See id. at 190-91. Additionally, the Court held that the application of FELA to a state
railroad could not be thwarted by state immunity. See id. at 192. But cf Seminole Tribe v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 57-62 (1996) (concluding that Congress has no power under the
Commerce Clause to abrogate state immunity from federal suits).
65. FELA provides that "(e)very common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce
between any of the several states ... shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury
while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce," and that "under this chapter an action
may be brought in a district court of the United States .... "
Parden, 377 U.S. at 185-86 (quoting 45 U.S.C. §§ 51, 56 (1964)).
66. See id. at 187 (noting that Congress "meantwhat it said" in FELA).
67. See id. at 190. Today, in contrast, the Court presumes that a state is immune unless
there is an explicit provision to the contrary. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S.
234, 241-42 (1985) (commenting that waiver must be expressed in unmistakably clear terms
within the statute).
68. See Parden, 377 U.S. at 190.
69. See id. at 192 ("By empowering Congress to regulate commerce,... the States
necessarily surrendered any portion of their sovereignty that would stand in the way of such
regulation.").
70. See id. at 192.
71. See id. at 192; see also United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 185 (1936) ("[B]y
engaging in interstate commerce by rail, [the state] has subjected itself to the commerce power,
and is liable for a violation ... of the Safety Appliance Act, as are other carriers .... ).
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situations in which a state entered into activities subject to federal
regulation and federal jurisdiction.'
Despite the creation of this expansive doctrine, the Supreme Court
severely limited the scope of the implied waiver doctrine over the
next twenty-three years.73 For example, in Atascadero State Hospital v.
Scanlon,74 the majority held that a state statute or constitutional
provision had to indicate specifically "the State's intention to subject
itself to suit in federal court" to constitute a waiver of immunity.7
The respondent in Atascadero argued that the state waived its
immunity to suit in federal court when it adopted language in the
state constitution stating, "Suits may be brought against the state in
such a manner and in such courts as may be directed by law., 76 The
Court disagreed, however, holding that such a general waiver was not
enough to subject a state to suit in federal court.77  The Atascadero
Court also held that even if Congress specifically addressed the states
in portions of a federal act, a state's mere acceptance of federal funds
72. See Parden, 377 U.S. at 196 ("But when a State leaves the sphere that is exclusively its
own and enters into activities subject to congressional regulation, it subjects itself to that
regulation as fully as if it were a private person or corporation."). Otherwise, employees would
have been denied benefits held by those working for private railroads simply because they
worked for the state. See id. at 197; see also Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S.
275, 281-82 (1959) (holding that states waived immunity by accepting the terms of a compact
that gave a state entity the power to "sue and be sued" and that Congress approved the waiver
under its Compact Clause power on the condition that the compact did not impair the
jurisdiction of United States courts over navigable waters and interstate commerce).
73. Employees of the Department of Public Health & Welfare of Missouri v. Department of Public
Health & Welfare of Missouri was the first in a series of cases that limited implied waiver. See 411
U.S. 279 (1973). In this case, the Court required a showing that Congress clearly intended to
waive the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity before finding that state participation in a
federal program constituted an implied waiver. See id. at 386-87. The following year, the Court
further limited the applicability of the implied waiver doctrine to situations in which Congress
statutorily authorized suits against a class of defendants that literally included states or state
instrumentalities. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 672 (1974) (stating that "constructive
consent is not a doctrine commonly associated with the surrender of constitutional rights"); see
also Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 452 (1976) (claiming that none of the statutes in Edelman
authorized Congress to join a state as defendant). Thus, the mere decision of a state to
administer federal and state funds in accordance with federal law alone is not a manifestation of
its consent to be sued in federal court. SeeEdelman, 415 U.S. at 673-74.
74. 473 U.S. 238 (1985). The Court analyzed the issue of immunity in three parts: two
dealt with implied waiver, while the third involved abrogation. The first part addressed whether
the state waived immunity by virtue of language contained in a state constitution. See id. at 241.
The second part discussed whether Congress had abrogated state immunity in unmistakably
clear language in a federal act. See id. at 242-46; see also discussion infra Part I.B.3 (addressing
the abrogation portion of Atascadero). In the third part, the Court decided whether the state
waived its immunity and constructively consented to suit by accepting federal funds under a
federal act. See id. at 246-47.
75. SeeAtascadero, 473 U.S. at 241.
76. See id. (citing CAL. CONST. art. III, § 5).
77. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 241 (concluding that California did not waive its immunity
because there was no clear statutory waiver specific to federal courts).
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did not amount to a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity.78
Rather, Congress had to make it clear that to receive federal funds, a
state must consent to suit in federal court.79 Several years later, the
Court expressly overruled Parden to the extent that Congress must
use statutory language that makes it explicit that states will be held
liable for suits brought against them in federal court.80
3. Congress may abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity
The third limitation on Eleventh Amendment immunity arose after
Parden when the Supreme Court confirmed that certain provisions of
the Constitution give Congress the power to abrogate state immunity
through legislative action.8' In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,12 the Court
recognized Congress' power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to abrogate state immunity when enforcing substantive
provisions of the amendment." In Fitzpatrick, male state employees
78. See id. at 246-47.
79. See id. at 247 (holding that because Congress did not manifest its intent to condition
participation in federally-funded programs on a waiver of immunity, the state did not consent
to suit in federal court).
80. See Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 478 (1987)
(adopting expressly what is known as the "clear statement" rule for implied waiver). Statutory
language constituting a general authorization for suit in federal court is no longer sufficient to
waive state immunity. See id. at 475-76 (finding that a statute providing relief to "seamen who
shall suffer personal injury in the course of employment" was general authorization for federal
suits and consequently an insufficient waiver). By disposing of the case based on statutory
language, the Welch Court avoided deciding whether Congress had the power to abrogate
Eleventh Amendment immunity under the Commerce Clause. See id. at 478 n.8.
81. Parden was based on implied waiver rather than abrogation. See Parden v. Terminal Ry.
of Ala. Docks Dep't., 377 U.S. 184, 196 (1964), overruled in part by Welch v. Texas Dep't of
Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468 (1987). Although the power to abrogate evolved later,
the foundation was laid in Parden. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1, 14 (1989) (stating
that the decision in Parden, which held that that the Commerce Clause gave Congress the power
to create FELA and that FELA applied to states as well as private citizens, laid a firm foundation
on which to build the direct abrogation theory), overruled by Seminole Tribe v. Florida 517 U.S.
44 (1996). The distinction, or lack thereof, between abrogation and implied waiver is
confusing. See Kinports, supra note 18, at 807-09 (noting the Court's discussion of waiver and
abrogation in Atascadero and Welch and concluding that the implied waiver theory virtually was
dead prior to Seminole Tribe); see also infra Part I.C.2; cf Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 672
(1974) ("The question of waiver. . . was found ... to turn on whether Congress had intended
to abrogate the immunity... and whether the State by its participation in the program
authorized by Congress had in effect consented to the abrogation of that immunity.").
82. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
83. See id. at 456 ("Congress may, in determining what is 'appropriate legislation' for the
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for private suits against States or state officials
which are constitutionally impermissible in other contexts."); see also supra note 21. Recently,
the Court limited Congress' power to enact statutes under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 527 U.S. 507, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2164 (1997)
(concluding that Congress may enforce the Fourteenth Amendment through remedial or
preventative measures but cannot make substantive changes in law), rev'g 83 F.3d 421 (5th Cir.
1996); see also infra note 238 (discussing abrogation under the Fourteenth Amendment). For
the effect of the Boerne decision on Congress' ability to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment by
abrogating sovereign immunity see infra note 238 and accompanying text. See infra Part III.B.2
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sought retroactive payments of retirement benefits and attorneys' fees
from the state pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
alleging that the state retirement plan discriminated against them
based on their gender.8 Contrary to its holding in Ex parte Young, the
Court ruled that Congress had the authority under the Fourteenth
Amendment to institute such an award in a Title VII action 85 even if
the award was paid out of the state treasury.86 Although Congress did
not explicitly abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity in Title VII,
8 7
the Court found that states are amenable to federal suits based on
Congress' Fourteenth Amendment power to enact and enforce the
Civil Rights Act and other "substantive guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment."'
The Court narrowed its interpretation of Congress' power to
abrogate immunity in Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon!9 by requiring
that Congress make its intent to abrogate state immunity
"unmistakably clear" in the language of the statute." In Atascadero,
the state denied employment to the respondent, who was disabled,
and the respondent filed a federal suit against the state alleging
discrimination in violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973. 9' Section 505 of the Rehabilitation Act provides remedies for
(discussing the Federal Circuit's decision in College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Education Expense Board, 148 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 67 U.S.L.W. 3258, 3279
(U.S.Jan. 8, 1999) (No. 98-531)).
84. See Fitzpatrick 427 U.S. at 448-49. Congress amended Title VII in 1972, authorizing
federal courts to award money damages to private individuals suing states for discrimination
based on race, sex, color, religion, or national origin. See id. at 448 n.1 (citing 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(a) (1970 & Supp. IV)).
85. See id. at 457.
86. See supra note 55 and accompanying text (stating that relief against officials under Ex
parte Young was limited to prospective injunctive relief); see also Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678,
698 n.31 (1978) (rejecting the immunity claim of state prison officials because Congress
enacted the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Award Act of 1976 under the Fourteenth Amendment,
where the legislative history indicated that Congress rejected the suggestion of state immunity
from liability).
87. The statute referred to an "employer's" liability for violating the Civil Rights Act, but
contained no explicit references to states. See42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-2(a) (1970 & Supp. IV).
88. See Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 457 (holding that Congress could exercise its Fourteenth
Amendment powers to allow an award against a state in a Title VII action).
89. 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
90. See id. at 242-43. In deciding if the requisite congressional intent to abrogate state
immunity is satisfied, the Court looks only to the language of the statute, ignoring other
evidence of intent such as legislative history. See Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 230 (1989)
(holding that parties aggrieved by the administrative process did not abrogate immunity in
relation to Education for the Handicapped Act and noting that legislative history "generally will
be irrelevant" in deciding whether Congress intended to abrogate Eleventh Amendment
immunity).
91. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 236. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 provides,
in part, that a program or activity receiving federal financial assistance may not discriminate
against an individual based on his handicap. See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994). Congress passed the
Rehabilitation Act under its Fourteenth Amendment power. See Welch v. Texas Dep't of
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violations of section 504 by "any recipient of Federal assistance. 92 In
holding that this general waiver of immunity was not sufficient to
abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity,93 the Court claimed that
the constitutional role of states distinguished them from other private
employers.94 The Court believed that its decision to require an
unequivocal expression of congressional intent to abrogate immunity
preserved the balance between federal and state government.9 5
Thirteen years after deciding Fitzpatrick, a plurality held that the
Commerce Clause, like the Fourteenth Amendment, also empowered
Congress to abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity.6  In
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,"7 the plurality held that the amended
language of an environmental statute clearly expressed Congress'
intent to hold states liable for the costs of cleaning up hazardous
waste.9 '8 The plurality also held that Congress had the authority to
Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468,472 n.2. (1987).
92. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 245 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1978)).
93. See id. at 242 ("Congress may abrogate the States' constitutionally secured immunity
from suit in federal court only by making its intention unmistakably clear in the language of the
statute.").
94. See id. at 246.
95. See id. at 242-43. But see id. at 253-54 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court
has made it increasingly difficult for Congress to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity,
with the paradoxical result that instead of protecting the federal system, the Court is protecting
states that violate federal law). The Atascadero Court conceded that in some circumstances,
when it was constitutionally permissible for Congress to abrogate immunity, "the usual
constitutional balance between the States and Federal government does not obtain." See id. at
242. To ensure that Congress intended both to override the balance maintained by the
Eleventh Amendment and to enhance federal jurisdiction, the Court decided that express
statutory language evincing clear intent to subject states to federal jurisdiction was required. See
id.
96. The plurality decision in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989), overruled by
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), which allowed abrogation under the Commerce
Clause, came two years after the Court avoided this issue in Welch. See Welkh, 483 U.S. at 478 n.8
(refusing to consider whether Congress had the power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment
immunity under the Commerce Clause).
97. 491 U.S. 1 (1989), overruled by Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). In Union Gas, a coal
plant operator blamed the state for a hazardous waste release and filed a third-party complaint
against the state, asserting that the state was liable for cleanup costs. See id. at 5-6. The state
claimed that, under the Eleventh Amendment, it was immune from liability imposed on site
.owners and operators" by the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA") and the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of
1986 ("SARA"). See id.
98. See id. at 7-8. Although CERCLA explicitly excluded states from liability if the state
acquired title involuntarily as sovereign, the language of section 9601(20) (D) provided that:
The exclusion provided ... shall not apply to any State... which has caused or
contributed to the release... of a hazardous substance ... and such a State... shall
be subject to the provisions of this chapter in the same manner and to the same
extent.., as any non-governmental entity, including liability under section 9607 of
this tide.
Id. at 8 n.1 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (20) (D)). But see id. at 45 (WhiteJ., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (finding no unmistakably clear abrogation language in CERCLA or
SARA).
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render states liable for damages in federal court because it enacted
the statute under its commerce power.9 In writing for the plurality,
Justice Brennan concluded that states relinquished their sovereign
immunity by ratifying the Constitution and granting Congress
plenary authority to regulate commerce. The plurality, therefore,
reasoned that Congress could make states amenable to suit if it
exercised its constitutional authority and held them liable.1'°
C. Seminole Tribe v. Florida: Congress Cannot Abrogate Immunity
Under Its Commerce Clause Power
In 1996, the Supreme Court in Seminole Tribe v. Florida0 narrowly
overruled Union Gas in a five to four decision, holding that Congress
had no power to abrogate state immunity under the Commerce
Clause ~ 0 2 In Seminole Tribe, an Indian tribe sued a state under the
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act ("IGRA"),1°3 which Congress passed
pursuant to its authority under the Indian Commerce Clause' ° The
state moved to dismiss the action based on its Eleventh Amendment
99. See id. at 23 ("CERCLA renders States liable in money damages in federal court, and
Congress has the authority to render them so liable when legislating pursuant to the Commerce
Clause."). Justice Brennan likened the Commerce Clause to the Fourteenth Amendment,
stating that both take power from states and give power to Congress, but neither alters the
scope of federal jurisdiction conferred in Article III. See id. at 16, 22-23.
100. See id. at 19-20. But see id. at 23-24 (Stevens, J, concurring) (arguing that Congress
could not alter the scope of the Eleventh Amendment through statute, and claiming instead
that Congress could subject states to suit in federal court under plenary powers conferred in the
judicially created doctrine of sovereign immunity). Justice Scalia, dissenting in part, argued
that Eleventh Amendment immunity was vital to the concept of federalism and that Congress
should not be able to abrogate immunity under its Article I powers. See id. at 38 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). The dissent distinguished Fitzpatrick and Congress'
ability to abrogate under the Fourteenth Amendment on two facts: First, the states ratified the
Commerce Clause before the Eleventh Amendment, while the Fourteenth Amendment post-
dates the Eleventh Amendment; and second, the Fourteenth Amendment explicitly restricts the
power of states. See id. at 41-43 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing
that congressional abrogation and constructive waiver of state immunity are essentially the
same).
101. 517 U.S. 44 (1996). Only Justice John Stevens sat on the bench as the remaining
proponent of Congress' power to abrogate state immunity (justices Brennan, Marshall and
Blackmun are no longer on the Court). The four remaining judges who dissented in part in
Union Gas, along withJustice Thomas, formed the majority in Seminole Tribe.
102. See id. at 66.
103. See id. at 51-52. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102
Stat. 2467 (1988) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1166-1168
(1994)), which allows tribes to conduct gaming activities only under a compact between the
tribe and the state, "imposes upon the States a duty to negotiate in good faith with an Indian
tribe toward the formation of a compact.., and authorizes a tribe to bring a suit against a State
in order to compel performance of that duty." See id. at47 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 2710). The tribe
sued to compel the state to negotiate in good faith to form a compact with the tribe. See id. at
51-52.
104. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have the Power... [t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.").
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immunity from suit in federal court.0 5 The majority granted the
state's motion to dismiss, holding that, "notwithstanding Congress'
clear intent to abrogate ... immunity, the Indian Commerce Clause
d[id] not grant Congress" the authority to abrogate state immunity.'
6
In dicta, the Court also addressed the implied waiver doctrine,
asserting that the abrogation issue in Seminole Tribe was "completely
unrelated" to the waiver issue in Parden.'°7 Notably, this dicta may
allow Congress indirectly to abrogate immunity through constructive
waiver under its commerce power.
1. Congress cannot abrogate immunity under its commerce power
After recognizing that Congress used language in the IGRA that
clearly abrogated state immunity to suit in federal court, the majority
held that, despite its clear intent, Congress did not have the power to
abrogate state immunity under the Indian Commerce Clause. 109 The
Court conceded that it previously had found authority to abrogate
immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce
Clause."' It concluded, however, that Union Gas was wrongly decided,
in part because the Union Gas plurality failed to agree on a rationale
for its holding."' The Court reasoned that it could not interpret its
decision in Fitzpatrick, which permitted abrogation under Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment, to justify limiting state immunity under
provisions such as the Commerce Clause that predated the
ratification of the Eleventh Amendment. 2  This rationale led the
Court to conclude that Congress could not use its Article I powers to
circumvent the scope of federal jurisdiction as defined in Section 2 of
Article III.'" Notably, the Court stated that the Federal Government's
105. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 52.
106. See id. at 47. Although the majority in Seminole Tribe argued that Congress could not
use its Article I powers to circumvent Article III limits on federal jurisdiction, the holding itself
is limited to Congress' ability to abrogate state immunity under the Indian Commerce Clause.
See id. at 72-73.
107. See id. at 65.
108. See infra notes 116-21 and accompanying text.
109. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 56-57 ("Congress has in § 2710(d)(7) provided an
'unmistakably clear' statement of its intent to abrogate.").
110. See id. at 59-60 (explaining that the Court previously allowed Congress to abrogate
Eleventh Amendment immunity under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and a plurality
found congressional abrogation powers under the Interstate Commerce Clause). The Court
claimed the relief sought did not influence whether a suit was barred by the Eleventh
Amendment. See id. at 58.
111. See id. at 63-64 (claiming that the Union Gas plurality had no rational basis for its
derision and that the decision contradicted the Court's notion of federalism).
112. Seeidat65.
113. See id at 72-73 ("The Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial power under Article
III, and Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional limitations placed on federal
jurisdiction."). The Court likened the Interstate Commerce Clause to the Indian Commerce
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exclusive jurisdiction over a particular area of law did not alter the
fact that the Eleventh Amendment restricts federal judicial powers
conferred by Article I1.1
Given the Court's expansion of Eleventh Amendment immunity in
Seminole Tribe, a state is immune from suits brought by private parties
in federal court with three narrow exceptions. First, a state may
expressly or constructively waive its immunity. Second, Congress may
abrogate state immunity under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to enforce the amendment's substantive guarantees.
Third, a state may be liable under the Ex parte Young doctrine if a
private party seeks prospective injunctive relief against a state official
to enjoin a continuing violation of federal law."5
2. Abrogation and waiver are "completely unrelated"
Despite the fact that the doctrines of abrogation and Ex Parte Young
were at issue in Seminole Tribe, the Court explicitly distinguished
"waiver" from "abrogation.""6 In dismissing the Union Gas plurality's
reliance on the Parden implied waiver doctrine, Justice Rehnquist
stated in dicta that "[t] he [Union Gas] plurality claimed support for
its decision from a case holding the unremarkable, and completely
unrelated, proposition that the states may waive their sovereign
immunity. '"" In Atascadero and its progeny, however, the Court held
that for a waiver to exist, Congress must explicitly condition a state's
Clause in that both granted power to the Federal Government at the expense of states, where
.no principled distinction" existed between the two. See id. at 63. The Court probably would
liken the Patent Clause to the Indian Commerce Clause because both Indian commerce and
patents fall exclusively under federal jurisdiction.
114. See id. at 72 ("Even when the Constitution vests in Congress complete law-making
authority over a particular area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents congressional authorization
of suits by private parties against unconsenting States.").
115. The majority in Seminole Tribe concluded that the Ex parte Young exception to state
immunity cannot be used if Congress explicitly included in the statute a remedial scheme of
enforcement that is more limited than the remedy afforded by Ex parte Young. See id. at 75-76.
Instead, the Court opted to limit the application of Ex parte Young to only those statutes in
which Congress either provided for an expansive remedy comparable to that afforded by Ex
Parte Youngor provided no remedy whatsoever. See id. A discussion of Seminole Tribe's impact on
Exparte Youngsuits is beyond the scope of this Comment.
116. See id. at 55 (noting that it was undisputed that the state did not consent to suit and
listing as issues the doctrines of abrogation and Exparte Young).
117. Id. at 65 (referring to Union Gas Court's reliance on Parden and Wekh). This dicta on
the implied waiver doctrine likely will cause great confusion in lower courts because the Court
provided no rationale for its allegedly "unremarkable" distinction. See Kinports, supra note 18,
at 832 n.77 (acknowledging the courts' differing treatment of implied waiver following Seminole
Tribe). At least one scholar believed that implied waiver survived Seminole Tribe and argued that
Congress may "solicit" state waivers under its Article I powers. See id. at 795-96. Recently, the
Federal Circuit held that a state constructively waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity,
Genentech v. Regents of the University of California, 143 F.3d 1446, 1454 (Fed. Cir.), petition for cert.
filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3337 (U.S. Nov. 3, 1998) (No. 98-731), but as of the publication of this
Comment, the Supreme Court has yet to clarify the status of implied waiver.
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receipt of federal funds on consent to suit in federal court in the
statute."18 To impose such a condition on states, Congress must be
acting under a constitutionally conferred power. Therefore, despite
the differences between the doctrines of implied waiver and
abrogation,"9 they are not "completely unrelated;" Congress must be
acting under constitutionally conferred powers to abrogate immunity
or to condition state participation in a federal program on its
constructive consent to suit in federal court."O By distinguishing
"abrogation" from "waiver," the Court may have allowed Congress to
abrogate state immunity indirectly through implied waiver under the
Commerce Clause and yet prevented Congress from abrogating
immunity directly under the same constitutional clause.1
II. CONGRESSIONAL ABROGATION OF ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
IMMUNITY FROM PATENT SUITS PRIOR TO SEMINOLE TRIBE
Before Congress passed the PPVPRCA in 19 9 2 ,22 the states were
immune from suits alleging patent law violations. By codifying the
PPVPRCA in sections 296 and 271 (h) of the patent code,'23 Congress
attempted to close this loophole, intending to hold states liable in
federal court for infringement and other violations of the patent
laws. 24 Moreover, the Federal Circuit interpreted the PPVPRCA as
abrogating state immunity from declaratory judgment actions in
which a party sought a declaration that a state-owned patent was
invalid. '2s This decision was important because it prevented states
from enforcing invalid patents against alleged infringers.
A. State Immunity Prior to the PPVPRCA
Prior to the Court's virtual elimination of implied waiver in
118. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text (discussing the holding in Atascadero and
Welh).
119. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
120. See supra note 81 (discussing the connection between abrogation and waiver).
121. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 43 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) ("There are obvious and fatal difficulties in acknowledging [the Parden
holding] if no Commerce Clause power to abrogate state sovereign immunity exists."), overruled
by Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
122. See PPVPRCA, Pub. L. No. 102-560, 106 Stat. 4230 (1992) (codified in part at 35 U.S.C.
§§ 271, 296 (1994)).
123. See35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h), 296 (1994).
124. See 35 U.S.C. § 296(a) (abrogating immunity "for infringement of a patent under § 271,
or for any other violation under this title"); cf. S. REP. No. 102-280, at 1 (1992), reprinted in 1992
U.S.C.CAN. 3087, 3087 (stating that the purpose of the Act was "to clarify Congress's intent
that States and State entities are not immune from infringement suits") (emphasis added).
125. See Genentech, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 998 F.2d 931,949 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (holding that a
state university was not immune from suit by a party seeking a declaratory judgment that the
university's patent was invalid and not infinged).
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Atascadero and its progeny, 1 6 various district courts held that states
were not immune from patent suits. 27 These courts relied on several
rationales to support their decisions. First, by granting Congress
exclusive control over patents, states "largely surrendered their
sovereignty over patents" even though the patent statutes explicitly
did not exempt states from compliance. 28 Second, a state could not
claim immunity when it violated a patent law because such a violation
constituted an action clearly outside the scope of its authority.'2
9
Third, a patent was property and a state could not take such property
without adequate compensation. However, when the Atascadero
Court required Congress to address expressly state immunity or
waiver within the language of the statute itself, the district courts had
no choice but to rule in favor of state immunity from patent suits.
Congress amended the patent code partly in response to the line of
decisions that afforded states immunity from patent actions under
the Eleventh Amendment. 3' In 1990, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit decided one such benchmark case,
Chew v. California.'32 This decision occurred five years after the
Supreme Court limited state immunity in Atascadero and one year
after the Union Gas Court granted Congress the power to abrogate
126. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 246-47 (1985) (implementing a
virtual elimination of implied waiver with the unmistakably clear language requirement); see also
supra Part I.B.3 (detailing the rise and fall of implied waiver).
127. See, e.g., Lemelson v. Ampex Corp., 372 F. Supp. 708, 710 (N.D. 11. 1974) (holding that
a state agency that purchased an allegedly infringing magnetic storage device was amenable to
suit and that money damages could be awarded against the state); Hercules Inc. v. Minnesota
Highway Dep't, 337 F. Supp. 795, 795-96 (D. Minn. 1972) (holding that a state department
infringed a patent and was subject to suit for injunctive relief but not for damages or
accounting).
128. See Lemelson, 372 F. Supp. at 711 (explaining the Parden implied waiver doctrine in
support of its holding). The Patent Clause grants Congress exclusive control over patents. See
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
129. See id. at 711-12 (arguing that immunity did not extend to illegitimate state actions);
Hercuks, 337 F. Supp. at 799 (relying on Ex parte Young in holding that state officials are not
immune when acting in violation of the Constitution).
130. See Lemelson, 372 F. Supp. at 712-13 (concluding that a state was liable for money
damages because it took property without compensation and must be treated uniformly under
the law for violating a patent holder's rights); cf. Hercules, 337 F. Supp. at 798-99 (arguing that a
state was subject to an injunction for depriving a patent holder of property but was immune
from monetary damages under the Eleventh Amendment).
131. See infra note 142 (explaining why Congress enacted the PPVPRCA). See, e.g., Jacobs
Wind Elec. Co. v. Florida Dep't of Transp., 919 F.2d 726, 727-28 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (holding that
the state was immune from an infringement suit but arguing that the patent holder could seek
relief by submitting a claims bill to the state legislature or initiating a "takings" suit against the
state under the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments); Kersavage v. University of Tenn., 731 F.
Supp. 1327, 1330 (E.D. Tenn. 1989) (finding a state university immune from paying damages
for patent infringement but finding a fact issue as to whether professors were afforded qualified
immunity as individuals or in their official capacities).
132. 893 F.2d 331 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
1998] SEMINOLE TRIBE V. FLORIDA 1755
immunity under the Commerce Clause. 3  After assuming that
Congress had the power to subject states to patent infringement suits,
the Chew court concluded that Congress did not intend to abrogate
state immunity from the patent laws.'" Prior to the PPVPRCA,
section 271 (a) of title 35 stated, "whoever without authority makes,
uses or sells any patented invention ... infringes the patent."' 5 The
Federal Circuit concluded that the term "whoever" did not
adequately abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity under
the Atascadero standard of "unmistakably clear" statutory language. 1
6
The court also noted that legislative history alone was not sufficient to
overcome equivocal statutory language, regardless of whether the
claim was under exclusive federal jurisdiction. 1 7 The Federal Circuit
therefore denied the patent owner any monetary relief for the state's
alleged patent infringement.)8 The court subsequently expanded its
holding in Chew to deny declaratory relief to parties suing state patent
owners as well. 9
B. Congressional Abrogation of Immunity in Sections 296 and 271 of the
Patent Code
Using the "unmistakably clear" standard that the Court set forth in
Atascadero,"0  Congress enacted and codified the PPVPRCA41 to
133. In addition to dismissing the patent owner's infringement claims based on state
immunity, the Chew court also dismissed the patent owner's takings claims. See id. at 331-32.
The court concluded that the proper party for a claim that Congress' failure to abrogate
qualified as a taking of property was the United States, not the state. The court further decided
that a state takings claim also failed because a patent infringement suit was not the proper
method of bringing a takings claim. See id. at 336.
134. See id. at 334. The Federal Circuit explicitly stated that it did not address the issue of
whether Congress had the authority to subject the states to patent infringement suits under its
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 power. See id.
135. Id. (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271 (a) (1982)).
136. See id. at 334-35.
137. See id. at 335 (stating that the Atascadero rule was not met because the statute's language
was not clear and claiming that an exclusive federal remedy was not grounds for supporting
abrogation).
138. The patent holder in Chew sought damages. See id. at 333.
139. SeeJacobs Wind Elec. Co. v. Florida Dep't of Transp., 919 F.2d 726, 728 (Fed. Cir.
1990) (applying the Chew holding to a plaintiff seeking declaratory relief). Just prior to the
PPVPRCA, a district court decided that a state university, as an arm of the state, was immune to
a counterclaim by alleged infringers who sought a declaration that a patent licensed by the
university was invalid and not infringed. See Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Alza Corp., 804 F. Supp. 614,
625-26 (D.N.J. 1992). The Ciba-Geigy court also held that the university had not intended to
consent to suit in federal court. See id. at 626. The university initially agreed to waive immunity
through a contractual provision in which the university was allowed to initiate or defend against
litigation connected to the licensing of its patent. See id. Prior to the defendant's counterclaim
seeking a declaratory judgment (but after the licensee initiated the infringement suit against
the defendant), the university amended the contract and agreed to be bound by any judgment
entered in a patent infringement suit, thereby retaining its immunity. See id.
140. See supra notes 77-79, 89-95, and accompanying text (describing Atascadero's holding.)
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establish explicitly that states could be subject to infringement suits in
federal court.42 The legislation amended the patent code by defining
the term "whoever" in section 271 as inclusive of "any State, any
instrumentality of a State, and any officer or employee of a State or
instrumentality of a State acting in his or her official capacity."'43 The
legislation also added section 296 to chapter 29 of title 35 to abrogate
expressly Eleventh Amendment immunity from suits involving
"infringement of a patent under section 271, or... any other
violation under this title.', 44 Finally, the legislation provided that all
remedies available against a private entity are similarly available
against a state, including damages, interest, costs, treble damages,
and attorney fees. 45
Congress asserted that it had enacted the PPVPRCA within its
constitutional powers, claiming authority under the Patent Clause,
the Commerce Clause, and Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.14  Because Congress has exclusive power over patents
under the Patent Clause, Congress reasoned that abrogation
"logically falls within [its] power to protect patent holders.' 47
Congress also relied on the Court's recent decision in Union Gas,
claiming that states had granted Congress the ability to regulate
interstate commerce and therefore had surrendered their sovereign
immunity.'4 Thus, the legislative history indicates that in abrogating
immunity from patent suits in the PPVPRCA, Congress believed it was
acting justifiably within its Commerce Clause powers.'49 Finally,
Congress claimed that the PPVPRCA was "an acceptable method of
enforcing the provisions of the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment. '' 5
Because federal courts previously found that patents are property, 5'
the provision of the Fourteenth Amendment that prohibited the
141. See supra notes 7-12 and accompanying text (detailing the PPVPRCA).
142. See S. REP. No. 102-280, at 7 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.CA.N. 3087, 3093 ("To
remedy the application of Atascadero to intellectual property laws, Senator DeConcini
introduced [the PPVPRCA] to explicitly establish that Congress did intend to subject States to
patent infringement suits in Federal court.").
143. 35 U.S.C. § 271(h) (1994).
144. See id. § 296(a).
145. See id. § 296(b).
146. See S. REP. No. 102-280, at 7-8.
147. Id. at 8. In its report, the Senate argued that the Patent Clause was included as part of
the Constitution because state patent systems were ineffective due to their non-uniformity. See
id.
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. Id. at 8; see also supra note 21 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' power to
abrogate sovereign immunity under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
151. See S. REP. No. 102-280, at 8 (recognizing that a patent is a form of property worthy of
compensation if infringed) (citing Lemelson v. Ampex Corp., 372 F. Supp. 708, 711-13 (N.D.
Ill. 1974)).
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government from depriving an individual of property without due
process of law applied to patents, where Section 5 confers upon
Congress the power to enforce this right.1
2
Congress offered several reasons for abrogating state immunity
from patent suits in the PPVPRCA. First, Congress claimed that
allowing states to infringe patents discouraged future innovation,
thereby inhibiting Congress from carrying out its constitutional duty
to promote the progress of science under Article I, Section 8, Clause
8.'" Second, Congress argued that prior to the passage of the
PPVPRCA, a patent holder's protection from infringement was
contingent upon the alleged infringer's status. For example, a patent
holder could sue a private school for infringement, but the Eleventh
Amendment protected a public school from a similar infringement
suit.' Third, because the Federal Government' 5 5 and private
individuals were subject to patent suits in federal court, states were
the only entities immune from such suits.'-; Congress could find no
justification for this distinction, noting that the "text of the Patent
Code and relevant authority demonstrates that Congress did not
intend to exclude States from liability [for infringement] .' By
enacting the PPVPRCA, Congress strove to correct these inequities by
providing uniform protection and remedies58 within the federal
152. See id. at 8 (claiming that the PPVPRCA was a "valid extension of Congress's right to
protect the property rights of patent... holders.").
153. See id
154. The Senate Report states that:
A public school such as UCLA can sue a private school such as USC for patent
infringement, yet USC cannot sue UCLA for the same act .... State universities
should not have an unjustified advantage in the commercial arena over private
universities for funding because of the potential for immunity from patent
infringement actions.
See id. at 9.
155. Although Congress claimed that the Federal Government consented to patent suits in
federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1498, see id. at 9, the liability of the United States is limited in
comparison to a private individuals' liability for infringement. The court in Chew makes this
point clear in stating that:
Congress has... not provided a forum for patent infringement suits against the
United States in Title 35. Rather it has provided for a suit for compensation in the
United States Claims Court where 'a [patented] invention is used or manufactured by
or for the United States.' 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (1982). Such suit is based on principles
related to the taking of property... and subjects the United States to payment of
appropriate compensation therefor, not to the liability or relief (such as treble
damages) provided in the patent statute.
Chew v. California, 893 F.2d 331,336 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
156. SeeS. REP. No. 102-280,at9.
157. 1d.
158. Congress considered and rejected a proposal to limit the award of attorney fees and
costs and prohibit the award of treble damages in patent suits against states and state
instrumentalities. See id. at 9-11. Congress rejected the limit of attorney fees based on the
rationale that such a limitation unfairly restricted the plaintiffs ability to be fully compensated.
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patent system. 59
C. Judicial Interpretation of State Immunity from Patent Suits Following the
PPVPRCA
Although it is clear that Congress intended to treat states and
nongovernmental entities equally in infringement actions, the
treatment of other actions arising under the patent title was not as
clear.'60 However, the Federal Circuit quickly interpreted the
PPVPRCA as abrogating state immunity to declaratory judgment
patent actions as well.' 6' Less than a year after passage of the
PPVPRCA, in Genentech, Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co.,'62 the Federal Circuit
denied the University of California immunity from a suit by a
company seeking a declaratory judgment that the university's patent
was invalid and not infringed. ' 63
The Genentech litigation involved a number of lawsuits filed in
California and Indiana district courts by or against three parties,
Genentech, Inc. ("Genentech"), Eli Lilly and Co. ("Lilly"), and the
University of California ("UC").'4 In brief, UC owned a patent
involving the use of recombinant DNA technology for the production
of human growth hormone ("hGH").'6' After negotiating with several
companies, including Genentech, UC ultimately granted an exclusive
license to Lilly.'6 Lilly demanded that UC sue Genentech for
infringement, and after accusing Genentech of infringement and
threatening to sue, UC filed an infringement suit on August 7, 1990
in the Northern District of California.l67 In response to UC's threatsto sue, however, Genentech had already filed a declaratory judgment
See id. Congress similarly rejected the prohibition of treble damages based on the fact that
treble damages are awarded only in cases of willful infringement, see 35 U.S.C. § 284,
concluding that states should be as liable as private parties for such egregious violations of
patent law, see S. REP. No. 102-280, at 10.
159. See supra note 10 (quoting explicit statutory language of the PPVPRCA); supra note 142
(noting congressional intent).
160. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
161. 998 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
162. See id.
163. See id. at 949. The court noted that changes in the law usually apply to pending cases.
See id. at 944 (citing Bradley v. School Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 711 (1974)).
164. See, e.g., In re Regents of Univ. of Cal., 101 F.3d 1386 (Fed. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520
U.S. 1193 (1997); Genentech, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 998 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Genentech,
Inc. v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 952 F. Supp. 617 (S.D. Ind. 1996); Genentech, Inc. v. Regents of
Univ. of Cal., 939 F. Supp. 639 (S.D. Ind. 1996), rev'd in part and remanded, 143 F.3d 1446 (Fed.
Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3337 (U.S. Nov. 3, 1998) (No. 98-731); Regents of Univ.
of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 734 F. Supp. 911 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
165. See Genentech, 998 F.2d at 935.
166. See Genentech, 939 F. Supp. at 644 (reporting that the UC-Lilly agreement included a
provision allowing Lilly to demand that UC sue for any infringements in federal court).
167. See id. at 640, 644.
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action against UC in the Southern District of Indiana on August 6,
1990, one day prior to UC's filing68 Genentech asked for a
declaratory judgment that the UC hGH patent was "invalid,
unenforceable and noninfringed."'1 ' The Indiana district court
dismissed Genentech's declaratory judgment action a year prior to
the passage of the PPVPRCA,'70 and Genentech appealed to the
Federal Circuit. When the Federal Circuit issued a decision in 1993,
it held that UC was not immune from the patent action, ultimately
vacating the dismissal as to the patent counts and remanding the case
to the district court.
1 7 1
The Federal Circuit noted that several exceptions existed even
though a state generally was immune from suit in federal court under
the Eleventh Amendment.'2 First, Congress could abrogate state
immunity based on the enforcement provision of the Fourteenth
Amendment or on its Commerce Clause power, provided that the
statute was explicit and clearly expressed Congress' intent to make
states amenable to suit in federal court. 73 Second, a state could waive
its immunity by consent to suit in federal court,'74 where such a waiver
168. See id.
169. Seeid. at640.
170. See Genentech, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. IP 90-1697-C (S.D. Ind. Mar. 7, 1991), cited in
Genentech, 998 F.2d at 935 n.1. The Indiana district court dismissed the declaratory judgment
claim in 1991 based on two rationales. See Genentech, 998 F.2d at 939. First, because the case was
decided prior to the PPVPRCA, it held that UC was immune under the Eleventh Amendment.
See id. Second, the court relied on a Seventh Circuit decision and held that a declaratory
judgment action for noninfringement should be dismissed if it was filed in anticipation of an
infringement suit. See id. at 937 (holding that a declaratory judgment action for
noninfringement in a trademark suit should be dismissed if an infringement suit is later filed)
(citing Tempco Elec. Heater Corp. v. Omega Eng'g, Inc., 819 F.2d 746 (7th Cir. 1987)).
171. See id. at 949. The Federal Circuit first vacated the Indiana district court's decision to
dismiss Genentech's declaratory judgment action because UC later filed an infringement suit.
See id. at 936-39. In holding that the lower court abused its discretion in applying Tempco to
patent actions, the court decided that first-filed actions were favored unless economics and
efficiency dictated otherwise. See id. at 937. The court declared that applying Tempco to patent
cases not only led to forum shopping on the part of the patent holder, but also contradicted the
purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act, which was to allow the accused to actively obtain a
resolution in a dispute rather than passively wait until the accuser initiated an action. See id. at
937-38.
172. See id. at 939 ("There are qualifications to the reach of the Eleventh Amendment... in
implementation of the constitutional plan.").
173. See id. at 939-41 (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976)). Notably, the
Federal Circuit cited Union Gas as the basis of its decision that Congress could abrogate
immunity under the Commerce Clause. See id. (citing Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S.
1, 19-23 (1989), overruled by Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996)). The Federal
Circuit's reliance on this decision is problematic because the Seminole Tribe Court overruled
Union Gas. See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's rationale for
overruling Union Gas).
174. See id. at 940 ("[T]he Court consistently has held that a State may consent to suit
against it in federal court.'" (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89,
99 (1984))).
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was manifest in a state constitution or statute, 75 or clear state
conduct. 76 Because the court was able to reach a decision based on
abrogation, it did not address whether UC had waived its immunity to
suit in federal court by using "its power to sue and be sued for the
purpose of conducting and threatening patent litigation in federal
court.
,177
The Federal Circuit rejected UC's claim that Congress only
abrogated state immunity for cases involving patent infringements by
the state,78 concluding instead that the PPVPRCA applied to "all
violations under Title 35 with respect to a patent owned by the
state."' 9 In reaching this decision, the court analyzed the plain
meaning of the statutory text, the intent of Congress in enacting the
legislation, and the legislative history.s" The PPVPRCA abrogated
state immunity "for infringement... or for any other violation under
[tile 351 ,"18 and the court claimed that the application of the statute
was not limited to the facts of state infringement cases like Chew and
Jacobs Wind Electric Co. v. Florida Department of Transportation.'
Although the headings of sections 271 and 296 of tite 35 of the
United States Code only refer to "infringement," the court stated that
one cannot look to the headings alone when interpreting a statute.""
The mere fact that the text at issue was broader than the heading
under which it appeared was not dispositive in that the text did not
contradict the headings.14  The court further concluded that the
legislative history confirmed Congress' intent to subject states to
federal patent law.'85 The court reasoned that by promulgating the
175. See id. (citing Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299 (1990)).
176. See id. (citing Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436,447 (1883)).
177. Id. ("It has become unnecessary to decide this [waiver of immunity] question broadly,
for in legislation enacted October 28, 1992 Congress abrogated state immunity from suit for
violation of patent law.").
178. UC argued that the enactment related to instances where the state infringed a patent,
but did not abrogate state immunity to declaratory judgment actions against the state. See id. at
941.
179. Id. at 943. This conclusion that Congress abrogated immunity to declaratory judgment
actions as well as infringement actions under its Article I powers cannot stand after Seminole
Tribe. See Genentech v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. 143 F.3d 1446, 1449 (Fed. Cir.), petition for
cert.filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3337 (U.S. Nov. 3, 1998) (No. 98-731); see also infra Part III.B.2.
180. See Genentech, 998 F.2d at 942-43. The court began its interpretation of the statute by
looking at the plain meaning of the text and the legislative intent and only considered
legislative history when the result of applying the literal interpretation of the statute was at odds
with the legislative intent. See id. at 942 (citing Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc. 458 U.S.
564,571 (1982)).
181. 35 U.S.C. § 296(a) (1994).
182. 919 F.2d 726 (Fed. Cir. 1990); see Genentech, 998 F.2d at 942.
183. See Genentech, 998 F.2d at 942 (citing Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Baltimore &
Ohio RIL, 331 U.S. 519,528-29 (1947)).
184. See id.
185. See id.
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patent amendments, Congress attempted to close a "loophole" in the
patent code.'m Interpreting the statute as only applying to actions
against states for infringement would defeat the goal of placing "the
states in the same position as nongovernmental entities as to the
patent law.'
87
In specifically addressing the declaratory judgment action, the
court found that UC was not immune from Genentech's action,
which sought a declaratory judgment that the patent in question was
invalid'88 In the PPVPRCA, Congress did not condition state
immunity on the procedure under which the claims were raised,'89
where the Declaratory Judgment Act is a procedural device as
opposed to a substantive claimY°  The court concluded that
Genentech's declaratory action arose under patent law and was
therefore covered by the legislative abrogation of immunity."
Holding otherwise, the court stated, would result in an unequal
application of the law to states in comparison to nongovernmental
entities, which would contradict congressional intent.'9 2 The Federal
Circuit decision therefore prevented a state from enforcing its invalid
patent against an alleged infringer.
III. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF STATE IMMUNITY FROM PATENT
SUITS AFTER SEMINOLE TRIBE
Because of its duration and complexities, the Genentech litigation
introduced in the previous section serves as a model for examining
the scope of state immunity from patent infringement and other
186. See id. ("It would be incorrect to truncate the statute... [and] thereby... reopen the
loophole that the statute was designed to close.").
187. Id. (citing 35 U.S.C. §§ 271 (h), 296 (1994)).
188. See id. at 944 ("We conclude that Genentech's declaratory action... is within the
statutory abrogation of state immunity, for the counts of the complaint that arise under the
patent law.").
189. See id. at 943.
190. See id. (noting that the DeclaratoryJudgment Act provides a procedure for obtaining a
declaration of legal rights and relations as opposed to a substantive right) (citing Skelly Oil Co.
v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671-72 (1950)). The court further noted:
[T]he declaratory judgment procedure may be invoked when there is a controversy
concerning an assertion of substantive rights under the Patent Act. To determine ...
immunity as to a particular cause of action it is necessary to look to the substantive
violation and other relevant criteria, not to the procedure for obtaining relief.
Id.
191. See id. (holding that an action for a declaratoryjudgment that a patent is invalid arises
under the patent law) (citing C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Schwartz, 716 F.2d 874, 879-80 (Fed. Cir. 1983));
see also EDWIN BoRcHARD, DECLARATORYJUDGMENTS 808 (2d ed. 1941) (stating that declaratory
actions by the patent holder or the alleged infringer claiming infringement or invalidity arise
under patent law), tiled in Genentech, 998 F.2d at 943.
192. See Genentech, 998 F.2d at 943.
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actions brought under patent law after Seminole Tribe.'9 The Indiana
district court's decision, on remand from the Federal Circuit, to grant
UC immunity, 94 as well as the briefs filed by UC,9"5 Genentech,'9 and
the United States197 and the 1998 decision in Genentech's appeal to
the Federal Circuit,'98 make it apparent that the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment remains unclear. What is
clear, however, is that to ensure uniformity, states must occupy the
same position as nongovernmental entities with respect to all patent
law, regardless of whether uniformity is reached through abrogation
or implied waiver. Only through such uniformity will Congress be
able to fulfill its obligation to "promote the Progress of Science," as
set forth in Article I,'9 and prevent states from infringing patents and
from enforcing invalid state-owned patents against alleged infringers.
A. Genentech, Inc. v. Regents of University of California: The
District Court Decision
Upon remand from the Federal Circuit, °20 the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Indiana relied on the Supreme
Court's decision in Seminole Tribe' to grant UC a dismissalY.
193. Because the litigation began prior to Congress' enactment of the PPVPRCA in 1992
and the parties appealed several of the district court decisions, see supra notes 170-71 and
accompanying text, the Genentech case not only raises complex issues regarding state immunity
from the patent code, but also tracks much of the Court's recent Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence. The Federal Circuit's decision regarding state immunity from infringement
suits in College Savings v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board, 148 F.3d 1343 (Fed.
Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 67 U.S.L.W. 3258, 3279 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1999) (No. 98-531), will be
discussed briefly as well.
194. See Genentech, Inc. v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 939 F. Supp. 639, 641 (S.D. Ind. 1996)
(dismissing the case under new case law), rev'd in part and remanded, 143 F.3d 1446 (Fed. Cir.),
petition for cert. filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3337 (U.S. Nov. 3, 1998) (No. 98-731).
195. SeeBrief forAppellee, Genentech, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 939 F. Supp. 639
(S.D. Ind. 1996) (No. 90-1679-C) [hereinafter Brief for Appellee].
196. See Corrected Brief for Appellant, Genentech, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 939
F. Supp. 639 (S.D. Ind. 1996) (No. 90-1679-C) [hereinafter Corrected Brief for Appellant].
197. See Brief for Intervenor, Genentech, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 939 F. Supp.
639 (S.D. Ind. 1996) (No. 90-1679-C) [hereinafter Brief for Intervenor].
198. See Genentech, 143 F.3d 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The Federal Circuit heard oral
arguments on September 8, 1997 and issued a decision on May 4, 1998. UC petitioned for
certiorari on November 3, 1998.
199. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (stating that Congress shall have the power "to promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries").
200. See supra notes 171 and accompanying text. Following the Federal Circuit's 1993
decision, Genentech and Lilly reached a settlement. See Genentech, Inc. v. Regents of Univ. of
Cal., 939 F. Supp. 639, 640 n.1 (S.D. Ind. 1996) (discussing settlements, resolutions, and on-
going litigation related to the human growth hormone patent), reu'd in part and remanded, 143
F.3d 1446 (Fed. Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3337 (U.S. Nov. 3, 1998) (No. 98-731).
Thus, the only parties remaining in the 1996 district court decision, see infra Part IIIA, and the
subsequent appeal in the Federal Circuit, see infra Part III.B, were UC and Genentech.
201. See supra Part I.C.
1998] SEMINOLE TRIBE V. FLORIDA 1763
Approximately one month after the Seminole Tribe decision, UC filed a
motion to dismiss the ongoing Genentech litigation based on its
Eleventh Amendment immunity. UC claimed that the Court's
decision in Seminole Tribe precluded a declaratory judgment action
against it.203  The district court conceded that Congress rightfully
exercised its powers under the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate
state immunity in cases in which a patent owner, and therefore a
204property owner, brings an infringement action against a state.
202. See Genentech, 939 F. Supp. at 646. Although Genentech admitted that the Seminole Tribe
decision included broad language concerning limits on Congress' Article I powers, Genentech
claimed that the Patent and Copyright Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment gave Congress
the power to abrogate state immunity to patent suits. See id at 642. Apparently, Genentech
interpreted the "sweeping language" in Seminole Tribe as only applying to the Article I
Commerce Clause and not the Patent and Copyright Clause, which also falls under Article I.
203. See id. at 641-42. Noting that exclusive federal jurisdiction over an area of law does not
influence state immunity from suit, the Court in Seminole Tribe held that Congress could not use
its Article I powers to circumvent Article III limitations on federal jurisdiction. See id. at 64243
(citing Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996)); see also supra note 113 (noting that
there is no distinction between the Indian Commerce Clause and the Interstate Commerce
Clause).
204. See Genentech, 939 F. Supp. at 643. The court noted that if Genentech owned a patent
and was suing UC for infringement, Congress could abrogate UC's immunity under its
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power to prevent the state from depriving a person of
property without due process of law. See id. Similarly, another district court concluded that
under the enforcement provision of Fourteenth Amendment, Congress could abrogate state
immunity "for claims under the Patent Act." See College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 948 F. Supp. 400, 425 (D.N.J. 1996), affd, 148 F.3d 1343
(Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 67 U.S.L.W. 3258, 3279 (U.S.Jan. 8, 1999) (No. 98-531).
The court in College Savings further stated, however, that Congress could enact legislation to
subject states to suit in federal court when states deprived patent holders of their property
without compensation or due process. See id. Because the facts of College Savings were limited to
patent infringement by the state, and not a declaratory judgment action against the state, it is
not clear if the court would have extended its decision to encompass declaratory judgment
actions. It is clear, however, that the district court in College Savings read the Fourteenth
Amendment broadly in applying it to abrogation of state immunity from infringement claims.
The district court also argued that the Fourteenth Amendment gives enforcement power to
Congress as to all provisions of Fourteenth Amendment, not just the Equal Protection Clause;
that when the states ratified the Fourteenth Amendment, they surrendered immunity from suits
for deprivation of property; that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is not limited to
intentional violations but can be used for actions that effectively, though unintentionally,
violate the amendment; and that Seminole Tribe did not foreclose Congress' power to abrogate
under the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 422-25. Notably, there has been confusion in the
district courts about the effect of Seminole Tribe on Congress' ability to abrogate state immunity
from patent actions, as the Genentech and College Savings decisions as well as a California district
court's note in Gen-Probe, Inc. v. Amoco Corp. demonstrate. See Gen-Probe, Inc. v. Amoco Corp.,
926 F. Supp. 948, 954 n.6 (S.D. Cal. 1996) (noting that the Seminole Tribe decision "would
probably compel the conclusion that the patent code cannot abrogate a state's Eleventh
Amendment immunity"). The Federal Circuit recently issued decisions in the Genentech and
College Savings appeals, thereby providing some clarification of the scope of state immunity from
patent actions. See infra Part III.B.2.
Just prior to publication the Supreme Court granted certiorari to College Savings and will hear
arguments concerning state immunity from an infringement suit. Hopefully the court also will
grant certiorari in the Genentech case to clarify further its Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence
when complexities such as declaratory judgment actions and implied waivers arise. See infra
notes 205-10 and accompanying text.
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Nevertheless, the district court dismissed the action, concluding that
Congress' power to abrogate state immunity under the Fourteenth
Amendment did not extend to declaratory judgment actions. 5 The
court reasoned that the private party suing the state owned no patent
and therefore had no protectable property right upon which it could
206
claim that it was deprived without due process.
As to implied waiver, the district court in Genentech held that UC
did not waive its immunity despite UC's participation in patent and
207licensing processes. The court acknowledged Genentech's concern
that if UC's conduct did not waive its immunity, it could procure
patents and file infringement suits in federal courts without the
threat of a declaratory action being filed against it, effectively giving
UC an exclusive position.208 The court concluded, however, that UC's
patent procurement hardly demonstrated consent to federal suit, that
UC's agreement with Lilly requiring UC to bring infringement suits
did not constitute consent, and that UC's threats to sue Genentech
also were insufficient.29 More importantly, the court decided that no
authority existed to support a finding of UC's consent to suit in the
Indiana district court, despite the fact that UC consented to suit in
California when it filed an infringement suit in a California district
court one day after Genentech filed its declaratory action in
205. See Genentech, 939 F. Supp. at 646.
206. See id. at 643. "UC is the patent owner, and Genentech has commenced a declaratory
judgment action against UC. Consequently, Genentech has no property right in the subject
patent. Moreover, Genentech has no protectable property right of which it has been deprived
without due process of law." Id.
207. See id. at 645 ("This Court is not inclined to extend the current case law on waiver to
include the conduct in issue in the instant case."). Genentech had claimed that UC consented
to suit when it obtained a patent, licensed the patent, agreed to enforce the patent,
subsequently threatened to file, and ultimately filed an infringement claim against Genentech
in response to Lilly's demands. See id. at 644.
Although the Indiana district court avoided discussing the implied waiver doctrine or its
status after Seminole Tribe in deciding that UC had not waived its immunity, another district
court addressed the issue in the College Savings patent infringement case. The district court in
College Savings held that by engaging in activity that Congress indicated would subject it to suit
in federal court, a state did not waive its immunity from suit. See College Savings, 948 F. Supp. at
420. Relying on the logic presented by Justice Scalia in Union Gas, the district court concluded
that Seminole Tribe overruled Parden by implication; a different conclusion would allow Congress
to achieve indirectly through waiver what it could not do directly through abrogation. See id. at
419 ("Parden has been overruled by implication by Seminole Tribe to the extent that Parden held
that Congress ... may explicitly condition a state's participation in a particular market on its
waiver of immunity from suit." (citing Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 42-44 (1989)
(ScaliaJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part), overruled by Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44 (1996))); cf Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 43 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ('There are obvious and fatal difficulties in acknowledging [the Parden holding] if not
Commerce Clause power to abrogate state sovereign immunity exists.").
208. See Genentech, 939 F. Supp. at 644-45.
209. See id. at 646.
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Indiana.1
B. Genentech, Inc. v. Regents of University of California: The Federal
Circuit Appeal and Decision
Genentech appealed the order of the United States District Court
of Indiana to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit.2 1 ' UC filed an opposition brief 1 2 and the United States
intervened . 3
1. The briefs filed on appeal
In its brief, Genentech argued that Congress effectively abrogated
Eleventh Amendment immunity from suits for all violations of the
patent laws 14 or, in the alternative, UC's conduct effectively waived its
210. See id. at 645 ("[W]hen UC allegedly responded to Lilly's demand by filing a suit in
federal court against Genentech, UC undoubtedly consented to such suit [in the California, but
not in the Indiana, district court]."). In an apparent contradiction to this holding, however, the
court admitted that the Indiana and California cases were "mirror images" and decided that
although UC did not consent to the declaratory judgment action in Indiana, discovery
conducted in the declaratory judgment case was fully applicable to the California infringement
case. See id. at 646.
211. SeeCorrected Brief for Appellant, supra note 196.
212. SeeBriefforAppellee, supra note 195.
213. SeeBrief for Intervenor, supra note 197.
214. See Corrected Brief for Appellant, supra note 196, at 16-20. In arguing that Congress
effectively abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity, Genentech addressed Congress' intent,
Congress' power, and the Indiana district court's 1996 decision. First, Genentech claimed that
in the PPVPRCA, Congress clearly and unequivocally abrogated state immunity from suits
arising under all patent laws, not simply infringement actions. See id. at 17-18. Next, Genentech
argued that even after Seminole Tribe, Congress had the power to abrogate immunity under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 18. Noting that Congress invoked the
Fourteenth Amendment in addition to the Article I Commerce and Patent Clauses in
promulgating the PPVPRCA, Genentech stated that the Seminole Tribe Court did not overrule
Fitzpatrick or its holding that Congress could abrogate state immunity in enforcing the
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 18-19. Genentech further claimed that the
issue was not whether Genentech was deprived of a cognizable property interest, but whether
Congress could create a uniform patent system to adjudicate and enforce property rights,
"including provisions designed to prevent the misuse of such rights." See id. at 23. Finally, in
challenging the district court's decision that a deprivation only could arise if UC secured
injunctive relief in its infringement action against Genentech, Genentech argued that it was
deprived of a property interest once UC threatened suit. See id. at 23.
In arguing that the threat was injurious, Genentech noted that after enactment of the
Declaratory Judgment Act, a patent holder's competitors no longer had to abandon their
business or continue to incur potential liability for infringement, but rather could sue for a
judgment on the conflict. See id. at 24 ("After the Act, those competitors were no longer
restricted to an in terrorem choice between the incurrence of a growing potential liability for
patent infringement and abandonment of their enterprises; they could clear the air by suing for
a judgment that would settle the conflict of interests." (citing Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v.
Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 734-35 (Fed. Cir. 1988))). UC's threat to file suit disrupted
Genentech's commercial activities and business. See id. (noting that Genentech had been on
the market for five years and had built a substantial and valuable enterprise for the
manufacture and sale of human growth hormone by the time UC threatened Genentech with
an infringement action). This threat deprived Genentech of a "coguizable property interest"
protected from state interference under the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 25.
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immunity from the declaratory judgment action.1
In its opposition brief, UC argued that Congress had no power
under the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate immunity from
216declaratory judgment actions. Further, UC claimed that the Court
overruled the Parden doctrine of implied waiver in Welch and Seminole
Tribe,17 and therefore, neither UC's participation in the patent
process nor its filing of an infringement suit against Genentech
waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity.
218
The United States intervened in the action and filed a brief that
219
addressed both the abrogation and implied waiver issues. On the
abrogation issue, the United States argued only that Congress had
the power to abrogate immunity as to infringement20 The United
215. Genentech argued alternatively that UC's conduct relating to the acquisition of the
patent, the licensing of the patent, and the enforcement of the patent waived its sovereign
immunity. See id. at 26-30. Relying on previous Supreme Court decisions, Genentech claimed
UC waived its immunity under the Parden implied waiver doctrine. See id. at 27; see, e.g., Welch
v. Texas Dep't Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 478 (1987) (holding that Parden is
inapplicable if Congress does not use clear language to condition state participation in federal
program on amenability to suit), overruling in part Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Ala. Docks Dep't,
377 U.S. 184, 192 (1964); Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Missouri, 411
U.S. 271, 284 (1973) (applying Parden to a situation in which the state operated business for
profit in an area where private persons or corporations normally control the business, but not
where the state operates a non-profit enterprise); Parden, 377 U.S. at 192 (holding that
operating a state railroad in interstate commerce where Congress conditioned such operation
upon amenability to federal suit waived immunity). UC conducted "business for profit in an
area where private persons and businesses normally run the enterprise," obtained and exploited
many federal patents through licensing agreements, and initiated and litigated suits in
enforcing its patent rights. See Corrected Brief for Appellant, supra note 196, at 28.
Additionally, Genentech argued that it was empowered to commence a declaratory judgment
action against UC based on UC's threats to file an infringement suit. See id. at 29 (claiming that
through its threats, UC created in Genentech a "reasonable apprehension" of an infringement
suit) (citing Arrowhead, 846 F.2d at 736). Any other result, noted Genentech, "would create
inequality and prejudice to non-state actors in the system." See id, at 30.
216. See Brief for Appellee, supra note 195. UG argued that the issue related only to the
declaratory judgment action, and thus the court should decide only this issue. See id. at 21 n.3
(claiming that College Savings does not affect the UC litigation); cf. id. at 18 n.3 (claiming that
UG probably is immune from patent infringement suits as well as declaratory actions). UC also
claimed that after Seminole Tribe, Congress had no power to abrogate immunity under its Article
I powers. See id. at 19-20. The Fourteenth Amendment similarly provided no authority, UC
argued, because Genentech did not own a patent and therefore had no protectable property
interest. See id. at 20-24 (noting that the patent amendments were not appropriate legislation
for enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment as to declaratory judgments because no property was
involved). The Supreme Court recently limited the scope of Congress' ability to enforce the
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment: Congress may take remedial and preventative
measures, but cannot make substantive changes in the law. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 527 U.S.
507 (1997), rev'g 83 F.3d 421 (5th Cir. 1996); see also infra note 238 and accompanying text
(discussing College Savings' treatment of Congress' power to abrogate immunity under the
Fourteenth Amendment).
217. See Brief for Appellee, supra note 195, at 29-33 (arguing that in light of the Seminole
Tribe decision, Congress could not abrogate nor waive Eleventh Amendment immunity under
its Article I powers).
218. Seeid. at33.
219. See Brief for Intervenor, supra note 197.
220. "Patents are a form of constitutionally protected property, and Congress had the
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States, however, did support Genentech's view that the Court did not
overrule the Parden implied waiver doctrine and that UC's
participation in commercial activities constructively waived its
immunity to the declaratory judgment suit.22' Finally, the United
States asserted that the Seminole Tribe decision did not destroy
Congress' power to abrogate immunity under all Article I powers,
such as the power conferred in the Patent Clause.2 Rather, the
United States limited its interpretation of Seminole Tribe to
eviscerating Congress' power under the Interstate and Indian
Commerce Clauses only, noting that further expansion of immunity
should be left to the Court.2
2. The Federal Circuit decision
Acknowledging that its 1993 Genentech decision based on Union Gas
did not survive Seminole Tribe,224 the Federal Circuit concluded that
UC waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity by constructively
consenting to Genentech's declaratory judgment action.2 The court
authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect such property from state
deprivation." Id. at 7. The United States explicitly took no position on whether Congress had
the ability to abrogate state immunity from a declaratoryjudgment action against a state. See id.
221. See id. at 6 (noting that under Parden, "Congress may subject States to suit in federal
court for actions arising out of their commercial activities"). In its brief, the United States
claimed that the Court distinguished Parden in Seminole Tribe and did not question the implied
waiver doctrine. See id. at 7. Because Congress intended to subject states to suit under the
Patent Act, where UC sought protection under the act and royalties under the patent, the
United States argued that UC waived its immunity through its continued involvement in these
commercial activities. See id.
222. "Seminole Tribe does not require that the language of the Patent Clause be ignored in
the course of applying Parden or in considering Congress's Fourteenth Amendment powers ....
[The Patent Clause] language explicitly suggests the propriety of adding remedial rights to
protect the substantive rights conferred under the patent laws." Id. at 17; see also id. at 8
(interpreting Seminole Tribe as possibly allowing Congress to abrogate state immunity under
Article I powers that "materially differ" from the two commerce clauses).
223. See id. (arguing that the Federal Circuit should leave the scope of Seminole Tribe's
expansion of state immunity for future consideration).
224. See Genentech v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 143 F.3d 1446, 1449 (Fed. Cir.) ("[I]n
light of Seminole Tribe this court's ruling in Genentech I can not stand on the ground on which it
was premised, whereby the unchallenged constitutionality of Public Law 102-560, as based on
Article I and Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, was interpreted as embracing all actions under Title 35
including declaratory actions." (referring to Genentech, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 998 F.2d 931
(Fed. Cir. 1993))), petition for cert. filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3337 (U.S. Nov. 3, 1998) (No. 98-731), rev'g
in part 939 F. Supp. 639 (S.D. Ind. 1996).
225. See id. at 1453, 1454. Judge Newman authored the opinion and was joined by Judges
Lourie and Rader. See id. at 1448. Assuming that, under the circumstances, the university was
equivalent to the state, the Federal Circuit declined to consider whether the university was in
fact an arm of the state for some purposes and not others. See id. at 1454 (noting that the
decision did not require the court to analyze "the magnitude of the commercial component" in
the relationship between research and disseminating research through patents and licenses).
Nevertheless, the court found as a factor in deciding that UC waived its immunity the fact that
commercially-oriented patenting and licensing was not at the core of the university charter. See
id. at 1453-54.
The Federal Circuit also addressed several other issues in its decision that are beyond the
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therefore based its decision on the doctrine of implied waiver and
avoided having to resolve whether Congress, after Seminole Tribe, had
the power to abrogate state immunity from patent suits under Article
I of the Constitution or Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.2
Nevertheless, the court did state that it would not read Seminole Tribe
as foreclosing abrogation of immunity under all Article I
congressional powers.27
Although constructive consent is rare,22' the Federal Circuit held
that the university waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity by
voluntarily creating a case or controversy that could be resolved only
in federal court.22 The court recognized that patents are national,
federally-created property interests under the exclusive jurisdiction of
federal courts; however, it decided that obtaining the patent alone
did not abrogate the state's immunity.2' ° Rather, UG constructively
waived its immunity by actively invoking federal judicial power after
entering a field subject to federal law.23' The court explained that UC
scope of this Comment, but should be mentioned. First, it held that rulings made in this
complicated litigation were preserved for appeal on final judgment. See id. at 1455. Second,
the Court decided that the university's antitrust and other claims were compulsory
counterclaims arising from the underlying declaratory judgment action. See id. at 1456. Thus,
because the claims bore a "logical relationship" to the claims in the suit, they were to be
litigated in the present action. See id.
226. See id. at 1452-53. The Federal Circuit chose not to decide whether the Fourteenth
Amendment or Article I supported Congress' abrogation of state immunity as to patent-related
declaratory judgment actions or infringement suits, noting that a decision on abrogation of
immunity as to infringement suits was pending. See id. at 1453 (citing College Say. Bank v.
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 148 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. granted
67 U.S.L.W. 3258, 3279 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1999) (No. 98-531)); infra at notes 235-38 and
accompanying text (discussing the College Savings decision). Rather, the court concluded that
the university, by its voluntary, litigation-related actions, constructively waived its immunity to
the declaratoryjudgment action. See Genentech, 143 F.3d at 1453.
In analyzing the two criteria required to abrogate immunity (a clear statement of
congressional intent to abrogate under a valid exercise of power), the court found that the
PPVPRCA fulfilled the clear legislative statement requirement but refrained from deciding if
Congress acted under a valid exercise of power. See id. at 1449, 1452. Notably, however, in
finding an implied waiver, the Federal Circuit did not discuss whether Congress explicitly
conditioned a state's enforcement of patent rights on its consent to suit in federal court. See
supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text (discussing implied waiver under Atascadero and
Welch). Presumably, because the court found that Congress expressed a clear intent to abrogate
state immunity in sections 271 and 296 of title 35, then Congress also explicitly conditioned a
state's participation in the federally-regulated activity on its consent to be sued in federal court
for violations under the patent code. See Genentech, 143 F.3d at 1449; see also supra note 10
(quoting portions of sections 271 and 296).
227. See Genentech, 143 F.3d at 1451 (disagreeing with the district court's broad reading of
Seminole Tribe that foreclosed abrogation of immunity under Article I powers).
228. See id. at 1453 (acknowledging that "imposition of consent to federal authority upon a
state agency is rare").
229. See id.
230. See id. ("Waiver or consent requires more than a strong federal interest in the subject
matter of the controversy. We do not hold that simply by the act of obtaining federal patents
the University waived Eleventh Amendment immunity.").
231. Seeid.at1453.
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voluntarily obtained a national property right in its patent, sued
Genentech for infringement in federal court, and threatened
Genentech with a federally-imposed injunction.s UC attempted to
argue that it simply was trying to obey the law by optimizing its
property, but the court distinguished patents as national rights
"independent of and ungovernable by state law.''23s Because these
voluntary and deliberate state actions constituted a constructive
waiver of UC's Eleventh Amendment immunity from Genentech's
declaratory judgement action, the Federal Circuit reversed the
district court's dismissal of the action and remanded the case for
further proceedings.
The court avoided the abrogation issue in Genentech, but within two
months of the decision, the Federal Circuit held that Congress
abrogated state immunity from infringement actions in College Savings
v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board.23 ' The two-part
analysis focused on whether Congress expressed, in "unmistakably
clear" statutory language, its intent to abrogate immunity, and
whether, in doing so, Congress acted pursuant to a valid exercise of
power.2 First, the court decided that in the PPVPRCA, Congress
clearly expressed its intent to abrogate such immunity to federal
infringement actions.237 Second, after extensive analysis, the court
concluded that Congress had the power to abrogate state immunity
from infringement suits when enforcing the substantive provisions of
the Fourteenth Amendment.m The Federal Circuit noted that other
232. See id.
233. See id. at 1454 (rejecting UC's argument that it was managing its property for the public
benefit in accordance with state law).
234. See id.
235. 148 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 67 U.S.L.W. 3258, 3279 (U.S.Jan. 8, 1999)
(No. 98-531). Judge Clevenger authored the opinion and was joined by Judges Rader and
Bryson. See id. at 1345. In this case, College Savings sued a Florida state agency for infringing a
patented investment program designed to help individuals fund their college education. See id.
at 1345-46.
236. The Court followed the Supreme Court's analysis in Seminole Tribe, first deciding
whether Congress unequivocally expressed intent to abrogate and then deciding whether
Congress acted within its Constitutional powers. See id. at 1347 (citing Seminole Tribe v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996)).
237. See id. (concluding that "the first step of the abrogation inquiry is plainly satisfied).
238. See id. at 1347-55. In deciding if Congress had abrogation power under the Fourteenth
Amendment, the court considered whether the legislative objective was constitutionally
legitimate and whether the means of achieving the objective were proportional to harm the
legislation was attempting to prevent. See id. at 1348 (explaining the rational relationship test
used to determine if Congress acted within its powers and quoting ChiefJustice Marshall on the
powers of Congress). Rejecting the state's argument that Congress may act under Section 5
only when enforcing the Equal Protection Clause, the court explained that patent infringement
was equivalent to a "taking" of property. Thus, it concluded that protecting patents from state
infringement was a legitimate objective under the Fourteenth Amendment's provision
empowering Congress to prevent a state from taking private property. See id. at 1349.
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circuit courts held that Congress could not abrogate immunity under
the Fourteenth Amendment because by doing so, Congress would
accomplish indirectly what Seminole Tribe forbid it from doing directly
under Article I. However, the Federal Circuit explained that
Congress could abrogate state immunity under the Fourteenth
Amendment because it was enacted after Article I and in adopting it,
the states "consented to cede a portion of their authority to the
Federal Government."239  Whether Congress has the power to
abrogate state immunity from any violation under the patent title,
including declaratory judgement actions, remains unresolved.
C. Why States Should Not Be Immune From Patent Suits
Public policy, fairness, congressional intent, and the Constitution
dictate that states should not be immune from suits in the federal
court system that arise under the Patent Act.240 To provide a uniform
system of protection over this exclusively federal area, Congress
should be empowered to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity
from federal patent suits under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment or the Patent and Copyright Clause in Article I.
Alternatively, Congress should be able to condition a state's
participation in the patent system on its consent to sue and be sued
in federal court for all violations of patent law.24'
Guided by City of Boerne v. Flores, the court next addressed proportionality, deciding whether
the PPVPRCA was an appropriate means to prevent states from depriving patentees of their
property interest. See id. at 1352-55 (discussing City of Boerne v. Flores and the Fifth Circuit's
holding that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA") was unconstitutional because
Congress tried to legislate the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment by requiring states to
show a compelling interest when enacting legislation that imposed a burden on religious
exercise). Distinguishing the PPVPRCA from RFRA, the court decided that the burden of the
PPVPRCA was small and not disproportionate with the objective of preventing patent holders
from enforcing their patents against infringing states. See id. at 1355 ("The [PPVPRCA] thus
achieves the congruence between the injury to be prevented and the means adopted to remedy
the injury that distinguishes a permissible, remedial exercise of Congress' power under the
Fourteenth Amendment from an impermissible extension of the substance of the Fourteenth
Amendment rights themselves.").
239. See id. at 1351-52 (listing cases from other circuits that addressed abrogation of
immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment).
240. But see Gerald B. Dodson, Emerging IP Issues in the Wake of Seminole Tribe, 490 PRAc. L.
INST./PATENT LrrIG. 179 (1997) (arguing that states should be immune from infringement and
declaratoryjudgment actions after Seminole Tribe); Weitzman, supra note 23, at 332-34 (arguing,
prior to Seminole Tribe, that states should be immune from patent and copyright suits). Dodson
represented UC in its appeal, and many of his arguments are explained in UC's brief. See
Genentech, 143 F.3d at 1448; see also supra notes 216-18 and accompanying text. Weitzman
believed that state immunity from federal suits was fundamental to the "structure of federalism"
where a unilateral statutory abrogation of state immunity would undermine federalism and
render the Eleventh Amendment "a practical nullity." SeeWeitzman, supra note 23, at 332-34.
241. Courts and scholars have suggested alternatives to subjecting states to patent suits
under abrogation and implied waiver theories. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72
n.16 (1996) (indicating that individuals can seek injunctive relief against state officials);Jacobs
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1. Fairness and public policy dictate that states should not be immune from
patent suits
As a matter of public policy and fairness, states should not be
immune from any suit arising under patent law. Whether the
Constitution allows Congress to abrogate state immunity as to all
patent actions or to condition a state's participation in the patent
process upon the state's consent to suit in federal court is a more
complicated issue.
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 empowers Congress to "[p]romote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries. 24 2 To promote science and technology, Congress
must enforce valid patent rights as an incentive for inventors to
continue to develop technologies. 3 In keeping with this obligation,
Congress also should not allow states to enforce invalid patent rights.
Congress, therefore, must allow those interested in promoting
science to question the validity of a state-owned patent. The
promotion of science will be stifled if a state's threats of an
infringement suit based on an invalid patent prevent those who are
developing a technology from pursuing the invention. The right to
enforce a valid patent against a state by allowing an infringement
claim to proceed against the state, and the right to prevent a state
from enforcing an invalid patent by allowing a declaratory judgment
action against the state, are equally important rights. It is crucial to
consider both of these rights when determining the scope of
Eleventh Amendment immunity afforded to states in patent suits.
In abrogating state immunity from patent suits under the
PPVPRCA, Congress intended to create a uniform system in which
states were afforded the same rights, remedies and restrictions as
Wind Elec. Co. v. Florida Dep't of Transp., 919 F.2d 726, 728 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (arguing that a
patent holder could seek relief by submitting a claims bill to the state legislature or by
instituting a "takings" claim against the infringing state); Dodson, supra note 240, at 236-39
(claiming that patent owners must seek post-deprivation remedies in state courts and
legislatures, and only if this fails will they be deprived of due process and be entitled to a
remedy under the Fourteenth Amendment); Weitzman, supra note 23, at 333-34 (suggesting
that Congress could create concurrent jurisdiction between federal and state law over patent
suits but recognizing resultant losses in uniformity and judicial expertise).
242. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, c. 8.
243. If an exclusive right to a patent did not exist, individuals who devoted time, money,
and energy in pursuing an invention would not reap the benefits of their labors because other
individuals could immediately take the patent owner's invention and use it for their own gain.
The exclusive right is limited in duration so that eventually, upon its entry into the public
domain, others may exploit the technology without paying royalties under a licensing
agreement.
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private citizens.244 Congress realized that affording states immunity
under the Eleventh Amendment resulted in the possibility that a state
could violate a patent holder's allegedly exclusive rights by infringing,
and the patent holder would have no remedy. 245 This result could
discourage inventiveness and prevent the progress of science.
Similarly, a state patent holder could threaten to file an infringement
suit against a private party, and the party would be unable to resolve
the matter by seeking a declaratory judgment that the state patent
was invalid and not infringed.247 The party would waste considerable
time, energy, and money in continuing to develop a technology if the
state followed through on its threat and a court decided that the
private party infringed the state's patent.2 48 To avoid this risk, the
party could abandon the project despite the belief that the patent was
invalid, thereby losing the time, energy and money previously spent
developing the technology. In amending the patent statutes,
Congress ultimately altered an inequitable system that allowed a state
to sue a private party for patent infringement or for a declaratory
judgment but did not afford a private party similar remedies.2°
State immunity from infringement suits, declaratory judgment
actions, and any other actions arising under the patent code must
continue to be abrogated or waived in order to avoid the
consequences of the inequitable pre-1992 system.25 Because states
244. See supra Part II.B (discussing the PPVPRCA).
245. See supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 153-56 and accompanying text.
247. In the PPVPRCA's legislative history, the Senate focused on infringement actions and,
aside from inserting statutory language that abrogated immunity as to all patent laws, the
legislative history ignored other claims. See S. REP. No. 102-280 at 1 (1992), reprinted in 1992
U.S.C.CA.N. 3087, 3087. Nevertheless, if Congress must protect patent holders from
infringement by enforcing valid patents, it follows that Congress should not enforce invalid
patents, and therefore must allow actions seeking a declaration that a patent is invalid and not
infringed.
248. See Corrected Brief for Appellant, supra note 196, at 24-25 (arguing that the threat of
an infringement suit deprived Genentech of a "cognizable property interest") (citing
Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 734-35 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). The
Arrowhead court recognized that the Declaratory Judgment Act provides a resolution when a
patent owner threatens an alleged infringer with a lawsuit. See Arrowhead, 846 F.2d at 734-35.
249. See Corrected Brief for Appellant, supra note 196, at 24 (describing how Genentech
had built a business on the human growth hormone before UC threatened an infringement
suit).
250. Cf supra note 139 and accompanying text (describing patent cases prior to the
PPVPRCA in which states were held to be immune from declaratoryjudgment actions).
251. Many of the alternative proposals to replace congressional abrogation and waiver of
state immunity from patent suits do not create a truly uniform or coequal patent system. For
example, if a state official is not violating a patent law, or if an individual erroneously pursues
the state rather than the state official, the Ex parte Young exception to immunity does not apply.
See Brief for Intervenor, supra note 197, at 16 n.4 (noting that Genentech failed to name
individual state officials, and the district court denied Genentech's request to amend the
complaint, thereby precluding Genentech from obtaining declaratory relief against state
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reap the benefits 2 of patent laws, these laws should be applied
equally to states, companies, and individuals.2s If Congress or the
courts allow states to infringe upon a patent or to enforce invalid
patents without the fear of facing an infringement or declaratory
judgment action, there will be less of an incentive to pursue
technological advancements. Unfortunately, although the Federal
Circuit recently concluded that both abrogation and implied waiver
limited state immunity from suits arising under the patent code, the
Supreme Court eventually may decide that Congress does not have
the constitutional power to abrogate immunity given the Court's
recent, limiting decision in Seminole Tribe.s
2. Congress has the constitutional authority to subject states to all suits
arising under the Patent Act
Despite the Court's expansion of immunity in Seminole Tribe,
Congress should retain the ability to subject states to all suits arising
under patent law. Assuming that patents are property under the
officials under the Exparte Youngdoctrine). State claims and takings actions may offer relief to
a patent holder claiming that the state is infringing, but these alternatives do not provide relief
to an allegedly infringing party who seeks declaratory relief. Concurrent jurisdiction might
provide a remedy against states in state courts to both patent holders and alleged infringers, but
only at the expense of uniformity andjudicial expertise. SeeWeitzman, supra note 23, at 333-34.
Allowing Congress to abrogate or waive state immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment
for all violations of the patent laws is the best solution. By abrogating or waiving state immunity,
Congress would retain the uniformity and judicial expertise currently available in the Federal
Circuit and would maintain a coequal system of protection under the patent code. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1295(a) (1994) (instituting a federal court with exclusive appellate jurisdiction over patent
cases); S. REP. No. 102-280, at 9.
252. The University of California filed nearly 400 patent applications, received over 120
patents, and garnered over $50 million in royalties on its patents in 1994. See V. Slind Flor,
Capital Legal Posts Sinecures No More, NAT'L L.J. 1, Aug. 26, 1996, cited in Corrected Brief of
Appellant, supra note 196, at 26; see also Genentech v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 143 F.3d
1446, 1454 n.6 (Fed. Cir.) (acknowledging the magnitude of UC's patent-related commercial
activity), petitionfor cert. filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3337 (U.S. Nov. 3, 1998) (No. 98-731).
253. Cf supra note 154.
254. See supra note 214 (referencing Arrowhead and arguing that the threat of an
infringement suit was injurious to Genentech). The following facts are particularly disturbing.
The district court first conceded that by filing an infringement claim, UC had consented to suit
in the California district court. The district court then decided that the discovery from the
Indiana action was applicable to the California action because the cases were "mirrors" of one
other. Nevertheless, the district court denied that UC consented to be a defendant in the
Indiana action, even though UC followed through on its threat to file an infringement claim on
the hGH patent only one day after Genentech sought a declaration that the patent was invalid.
See Genentech, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 939 F. Supp. 639, 645-46 (S.D. Ind. 1996),
rev'd in part and remanded, 143 F.3d 1446 (1998). Instead of resolving the matter through a
judicial decision on the validity of the patent, the parties spent a great deal of time, effort and
money litigating a variety of other issues. Ultimately, however, if UC can seek protection of the
patent system by filing an infringement claim, it is only fair that UC is equally amenable to suits
against it by individuals alleging that UC is infringing a patent or that UC's patent is invalid and
not infringed.
255. See supra Part I.C.
THE AMERICAN UNIvERsrry LAw REVIEW [Vol. 47:1735
Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court should uphold
Congress' power from abrogate state immunity from infringement
suits in College Savings. Because the states ratified the Fourteenth
Amendment well after Article I, the states ceded some authority to
the Federal Government. Thus, Congress' power to abrogate state
immunity when enforcing the substantive provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment should not be limited by the Seminole Tribe
decision. Nevertheless, the impending resolution of the
infringement issue does not resolve an issue of even greater
complexity: Congress' ability to abrogate or constructively waive
sovereign immunity from declaratory judgment actions. The Court
therefore should grant certiorari in Genentech or a similar case in an
attempt to clarify further its Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence on
abrogation and implied waiver.
The Seminole Tribe decision did not expressly overrule Fitzpatrick,2
which allowed Congress to abrogate state immunity in enforcing the
substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.257  One
provision of the Fourteenth Amendment allows Congress to prevent
states from depriving an individual of property without due process.m
Because federal courts have recognized patents as a cognizable
property interest, 9 Congress constitutionally may abrogate state
immunity if a patent holder alleges in an infringement suit that a
state has deprived him of his property."
In contrast, in a declaratory judgment action, the state owns the
patent. Whether the party seeking the declaration has a protectable
property interest is therefore a matter of judicial interpretation.
Because the party likely spends a considerable amount of time and
money developing the technology prior to and perhaps even during
the threat of infringement, the Court should recognize the prior
development effort and the technology resulting from the effort as a
256. SeeSeminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,59-60 (1996).
257. See supra Part I.B.3.
258. Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, "Congress shall have the power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of [the Fourteenth Amendment]," including
Section 1 which provides, "nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; cf supra note 206 and accompanying
text (explaining that Genentech did not own the patent and therefore had no property to
protect).
259. See supra note 130 (citing Lemelson and Hercules).
260. See College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 148 F.3d
1343, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 67 U.S.L.W. 3258, 3279 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1999) (No. 98-
531) (concluding that Congress could abrogate state immunity from patent infringement
claims under the Fourteenth Amendment's enforcement provision), ajj'g 948 F. Supp. 400,425
(E.D.NJ. 1996).
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protectable property interest.261 If the Court does not recognize such
a property interest, however, Congress might not be empowered to
abrogate state immunity from declaratory judgment actions.
The Seminole Tribe Court expressly eliminated Congress' authority
to abrogate state immunity under the Commerce Clause,26 2 and the
scope of Seminole Tribe's expansion of immunity may encompass the
elimination of Congress' abrogation authority under any Article I
clause, including the Patent Clause. If courts interpret Seminole
Tribe expansively, a state may be immune from actions seeking a
declaration that a state-owned patent is invalid and not infringed.2
State immunity would result in an inequitable system, however, and
would impair the promotion of technology.
If judicial interpretations eliminate the possibility of abrogating
state immunity from declaratory judgments, the states should be
amenable to all suits arising under the patent code based on the
implied waiver doctrine.2 5 Because a state participates in, gains
economic benefits from, and seeks protection under the patent
system, a state should be deemed to have consented to patent suits in
federal court. The implied waiver doctrine in Parden arose from a
conditional waiver of immunity from federal suits based on Congress'
commerce power. In Seminole Tribe, the majority eliminated the
possibility of abrogating immunity under the commerce power, but
asserted that abrogation and waiver were completely unrelated.
Although it seems absurd that Seminole Tribe might allow Congress to
do indirectly what it cannot do directly,26 the Supreme Court has not
261. See supra note 214 (explaining Genentech's argument that it built its business on the
human growth hormone technology and that the threat of an infringement suit deprived it of a
property interest).
262. See supra Part I.C.1.
263. In his Seminole Tribe dissent, Justice Stevens seems to indicate that the majority's
decision may protect states from all patent suits. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 77
n.1 (1996) (Stevens J., dissenting). But see supra notes 222-23 and accompanying text
(explaining the United States' position that Seminole Tribe did not destroy Congress' ability to
abrogate state immunity under all Article I powers).
264. See Genentech, Inc. v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 939 F. Supp. 639, 641 (S.D. Ind. 1996)
(deciding that a state university is immune to a declaratory judgment suit arising under the
patent laws), re,'d in part and remanded, 143 F.3d 1446 (Fed. Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 67
U.S.L.W. 3337 (U.S. Nov. 3, 1998) (No. 98-731).
265. See supra Part I.B.2 (presenting cases on the development and use of the implied waiver
doctrine).
266. See supra notes 64-72 and accompanying text (documenting the creation of the
doctrine of implied waiver).
267. See supra Part I.C.2.
268. See College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 948 F. Supp.
400, 419 (E.D.NJ. 1996) (insisting that Seminole Tribe overruled Parden by implication and
therefore Congress does not have the power to abrogate or constructively waive state
immunity), affd on other grounds, 148 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 67 U.S.L.W. 3258,
3279 (U.S.Jan. 8, 1999) (No. 98-531).
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explicitly overruled Parden.69 Congress therefore remains authorized
under Parden to condition a state's participation in commercial
activity on its consent to suit in federal court. Thus, if a state
participates in the patent process and exercises its rights, the Court
should follow the Federal Circuit and hold that the state voluntarily
consented to suit in federal court for all claims arising under the
Patent Act, including declaratory judgment actions.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Seminole Tribe v. Florida may have
drastically expanded the scope of state immunity from patent suits,
although the precise status of state immunity currently is unclear.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit recently
limited the scope of Eleventh Amendment immunity from patent
infringement suits under the abrogation theory and declaratory
judgment suits under the implied waiver theory.271 The Supreme
Court will alleviate some confusion concerning Congress' ability to
abrogate state immunity upon issuing an opinion in the College
Savings infringement action. However, the Court should clarify the
status of the doctrine of implied waiver by granting certiorari in the
Genentech declaratory judgment action or a similar case involving
patent, copyright, antitrust, bankruptcy law, or other area of law
under exclusive federal jurisdiction. Given the history of the
Supreme Court's interpretation of Eleventh Amendment immunity,
however, any resolution probably will not endure. One only can
hope the congressional power to provide a uniform system of
protection and remedies through the Patent Act survives, enabling
Congress to promote effectively the progress of science.
269. See supra note 221 (noting that the United States argued that implied waiver survived
Seminole Tribe).
270. See supra 235-38 and accompanying text (describing the Federal Circuit's 1998 College
Savings decision).
271. See supra notes 224-34 and accompanying text (describing the Federal Circuit's 1998
Genentech decision).
1776
